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GETTING OUT OF THIS MESS: STEPS
TOWARD ADDRESSING AND AVOIDING
INORDINATE DELAY IN CAPITAL CASES
DWIGHT AARONS"
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently a number of state capital defendants have claimed
that after their lengthy stay on death row their pending execu-
tions will make no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment, will be nothing more than the imposition of
needless pain and suffering, and therefore violate the Eighth
Amendment. Elsewhere I have essentially agreed that when an
inmate has been on death row for an inordinate period-that is,
twice the national average of other executed inmates-the
pending execution may constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment.1 This Article deals with the procedural morass surround-
ing the inordinate delay claim.
Part II details a few of the cases in which inordinate delay
was asserted. It concludes that a defendant is more likely to be
on death row for an inordinate period when the case is on the
margins of death eligibility and errors occur during the state's
processing of the case. Part III reviews the processing of capital
. Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law. I thank
Judy Cornett who again provided exceptional assistance and wonderful company.
Fran Ansley and Neil P. Cohen commented on an earlier draft. Jerry Phillips gave me
the benefit of his agile mind and sharp eye with a careful read on a later draft. Kelly
Browne of The University of Tennessee College of Law Library was courteous with
her assistance in finding otherwise inaccessible information. A conversation with
Stephen B. Bright prompted me to wrestle with my understanding of federal habeas
law. I remain responsible for any errors.
' See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Con-
stitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 147 (1998). As discussed
more fully in my previous article, inordinate delay need not be strictly defined as
twice the national average, but such a period provides a ready reference point for
death row cases in general.
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cases in California, Florida and Texas-the three states with the
largest death row populations-and in a number of other juris-
dictions. Despite a firm commitment to capital prosecutions,
tle states have not established effective and efficient capital case
processing systems. Consequently, most of the delay that
elapses between the imposition of a death sentence and the
execution of a capital defendant is the responsibility of state of-
ficials.
Part IV outlines the procedural posture under which federal
habeas courts will address the issue and proposes how courts
should address inordinate delay claims. State capital defendants
will likely rely on the procedure outlined in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to litigate their inor-
dinate delay claims in federal court. Under the AEDPA, a capi-
tal defendant is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his or her
habeas corpus petition if the petition credibly alleges that his or
her detention violates the Constitution or federal law. A capital
defendant asserting inordinate delay can rely on his or her post-
sentencing conduct as a basis for challenging the appropriate-
ness of his or her death sentence. Part V addresses common ob-
jections expressed against recognizing inordinate delay as a
substantive limit on death eligibility. These objections do not
withstand scrutiny because they do not reflect the actual dynam-
ics of the capital litigation process. Therefore, courts should no
longer continue to rely on these objections as reasons for not
considering the merits of inordinate delay claims.
Finally, Part VI contains suggestions on how to avoid inor-
dinate delay in capital cases. The issue of inordinate delay im-
plicates how the death penalty is administered. Therefore,
inordinate delay can possibly be avoided if the capital litigation
process is refocused to ensure that only defendants most deserv-
ing of death are prosecuted for capital crimes. This refocusing
should include reconsidering the roles of prosecutors, judges,
defense attorneys, and the public at large in capital cases.
II. CAPrrAL CASES THAT TPICALLY LEAD TO INORDINATE DELAY
Inordinate delay between the imposition of a death sen-
tence and the execution is most likely to occur when a serious
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error occurs during the prosecution of the case, and that error
is discovered while the case is being processed. This Part re-
views-in some detail-a few of the fairly representative cases in
which a capital defendant was on death row for twice as long as
the national average, and asserted before a subsequent court
that the state had forfeited the right to execute him.
A. CARYL WHITrIER CHESSMAN
In 1948, Caryl Whittier Chessman was convicted and sen-
tenced to death for crimes committed by a man dubbed the
"Red Light Bandit."3  For the next twelve years, Chessman
claimed that his conviction should be reversed because he was
denied due process, based on the manner by which his trial
transcript was constructed.4  He had mixed success By 1959,
Chessman was also asserting that his continued confinement
"This Part is based largely on Aarons, supra note 1, at 168-76.
" See EDMUND G. BROWN & DicK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCy. A
GovERNOR'S EDUCATION ON DEATH Row 20-52 (1989); ERIc CummS, THE RISE AND
FALL OF CALiFORNIA'S RADICAL PRISON MOvEmENT 33-62 (1994); WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER,
BE'OND A REASONABLE DOUBT? THE ORiGINAL TRIAL OF CARYL CHESsMAN (1961).
The court reporter died soon after the jury returned with its verdict, but before
his notes had been transcribed into a trial transcript. See People v. Chessman, 341
P.2d 679, 684 (Cal. 1959). A substitute court reporter prepared a trial transcript us-
ing the original reporter's notes, the trial judge's notes and the prosecutor's assis-
tance. Id. Chessman received a copy in prison and he objected, claiming that the
transcript was inaccurate and incomplete. Id. Based on these objections, the trial
judge made some corrections Chessman suggested. Id. at 685.
5 In 1957, on appeal from the denial of a federal habeas corpus petition, he per-
suaded a majority of the United States Supreme Court that he should have had a
hearing on whether the preparation of the state court record accorded with federal
due process. See Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957). By that time, Chessman
had discovered that the substitute reporter was related by marriage to the trial prose-
cutor, and had worked in close collaboration with the prosecutor and two police offi-
cers with their trial testimony. Id. at 161. In remanding the case the Court wrote:
All we hold is that, consistently with procedural due process, California's affir-
mance of petitioner's conviction upon a seriously disputed record, whose accuracy peti-
tioner has had no voice in determining, cannot be allowed to stand. Without blinking
the fact that the history of this case presents a sorry chapter in the annals of delays in
the administration of criminal justice, we cannot allow that circumstance to deter us
from withholding relief so clearly called for .... This Court may not disregard the Con-
stitution because an appeal in this case, as in others, has been made on the eve of exe-
cudon.
Id. at 164-65 (footnotes omitted).
DWIGHT AARONS
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. He persuaded
neither the courts nor the governor and on May 2, 1960, Cali-
fornia executed him.6
B. CHARLEs TOwNSEND
Charles Townsend was prosecuted for murder in 1955. The
key issue in his case was the admissibility of a confession he gave
while under the influence of drugs administered by a police
physician. Over Townsend's objection, the confession was ad-
mitted and he was convicted and sentenced to death. After his
conviction was affirmed in state court,7 the United States Su-
preme Court, on federal habeas review, ordered the district
court to hold a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the
confession! The district judge later found that the confession
was voluntary, but nonetheless ordered a retrial within four
months because of "evidentiary defects" in the trial.9 That
judgment was reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
because erroneous evidentiary rulings were not a basis for grant-
ing federal habeas corpus relief;10 the writ can issue only when a
prisoner is being held in custody in violation of federal laws or
the Constitution. Townsend filed a second federal habeas peti-
tion in 1967. In 1971, by the time the district court held an-
other hearing and addressed the merits of the second petition,
Townsend was thought to be this nation's longest inhabitant of
death row." This time the district court ruled that -the state-
ment was involuntary and its admission violated Townsend's
6 KUNST=R, supra note 3, at 286-88.
7People v. Townsend, 141 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. 1957).
' Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
9 United States ex rel Townsend v. Ogilive, 334 F.2d 837, 841-42 (7th Cir. 1964).
10 1&
" Townsend argued that a 15-year, nine-month delay on death row was unconstitu-
tional. United States ex reL Townsend v. Twomey, 322 F. Supp. 158, 159 (E.D. Ill.),
rev'd, 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1971). The district court did not directly rule on that ar-
gument, but noted that the delay was "due principally to the skillful, persistent and
conscientious efforts on petitioner's behalf by his own counsel to save him from the
death penalty and secure his release from confinement." Id. at 174. Apparently in-
terpreting Townsend's argument as a challenge to the method of execution, the dis-
trict court stated that it was bound by stare decisis to declare that execution by
electrocution was not cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
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constitutional rights. 2 That judgment, too, was reversed by the
Seventh Circuit.5 The appellate court ruled that the district
court had abused its discretion in adjudicating the merits of the
second petition because there had been no change in the fac-
tual or legal background of Townsend's claim since it had been
rejected by the appellate court three years earlier.14 However,
the death sentence was vacated on a different ground.'5
C. WLIE LEE RICHMOND
In 1974, Willie Lee Richmond was convicted of robbery and
first degree murder. The jury was instructed on both premedi-
tated murder and felony murder, but in returning with a gen-
eral verdict, it did not indicate which theory it adopted. 6 The
trial judge imposed a death sentence.7 That sentence was later
vacated after the Arizona Supreme Court, following the then-
recently decided United States Supreme Court decisions in
Lockett v. Ohio8 and Bell v. Ohio,19 held that the Arizona state law
" Townsend, 322 F. Supp. at 176. As an alternative basis for its ruling, the court
found the confession involuntary because of the physical and psychological coercion
used to secure the statement.
's United States ex. relTownsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1971).
5 The court ruled that Townsend's rights under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968) (death sentence cannot be carried out if prospective jurors are excluded from
the venire because they voiced general objections, conscientious or religious scruples
against its infliction), were violated and that the death sentence could not be im-
posed. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions that the state
had to exercise its choice of either (1) resentencing Townsend, (2) vacating the con-
viction and death sentence and retrying him, or (3) releasing Townsend. Townsend,
452 F.2d at 360-63.
This remand order did not end the litigation. In an appeal after the remand,
Townsend argued that Illinois failed to comply with the court's mandate. The circuit
panel did not fully agree. Nearly two years after the remand order Townsend had
been sentenced to 14 to 50 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit stated that its
1971 mandate was for Illinois to decide within four months how it would proceed.
The delay in resentencing appeared to be due, in part, to Townsend's counsel obtain-
ing several continuances before the resentencing was held. See United States ex rel-
Townsend v. Twomey, 493 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1974).
" State v. Richmond, 666 P.2d 57, 62 (Ariz. 1983).
'7 State v. Richmond, 560 P.2d 41, 44 (Ariz. 1976).
"a 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (due process requires in all but rarest capital case sentencer
not be precluded from considering as mitigating factor any aspect of defendant's
character or record and any of circumstances of crime that is proffered as basis for
sentence less than death).
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unconstitutionally restricted mitigating circumstances evidence
that capital defendants could present."0 At a subsequent sen-
tencing hearing, Richmond was again sentenced to death.
Though it disagreed over which aggravating circumstances sup-
ported the death sentence, a divided Arizona Supreme Court af-
firmed the sentence.'
Richmond later asserted that the state's twelve-year delay in
executing him, coupled with the conditions of his confinement,
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The federal courts re-
jected his claim. The district court judge noted that Richmond
had made good use of his time on death row-in no longer be-
ing exposed to drugs and undergoing a religious conversion-
and that the delay was initiated by him to challenge his convic-
tion and sentence. 2 In affirming that ruling, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals added that a capital defendant should not be
penalized for his legitimate exercise of his right to appeal, but
that the delay caused by such appeals could not itself ripen into
438 U.S. 637 (1978) (reversing death sentence under Locket).
'0 State v. Watson, 586 P.2d 1253 (Ariz. 1978).
"State v. Richmond, 666 P.2d 57 (Ariz. 1983).
"In relevant part, the district court stated:
In a case such as this one, where the death penalty is being imposed, the need for a
careful review of the issues is dear.
The time on death row has not been completely harmful to Richmond. He has
been able to develop better skills in communicating with others. He is no longer ex-
posed to the combination of drugs that he was taking at the time of the murder. Rich-
mond has also developed religious beliefs that he did not have before he went to prison.
Richmond has been under a death sentence for approximately twelve years. He has
been subject to the current sentence of death for only six years. Although the condi-
tions on death row may not be ideal, there is no evidence of cruel and unusual punish-
ment presented sufficient to warrant the relief Richmond seeks here.
The delay in execution was prompted by Richmond's request, through his attor-
neys, to have his challenges to the state court proceedings and the constitutional chal-
lenges to the sentence of death heard by several courts. The fact that this review has
taken a long time does not indicate that the delay is unwarranted. The careful review of
the issues raised by Richmond is time consuming. However, it is the opinion of this
court that it is better to take the time to consider each issue thoroughly rather than
quickly dispatching someone to the gas chamber. Richmond has presented nothing to
this court which would support the relief he seeks under this allegation.
Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986), affid, 921 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40 (1992), and vacated, 986 F.2d 1583 (9th
Cir. 1993).
1998] DELAY IN CAP1TAL CASES
a substantive claim.23 In 1994, after twenty years on death row,
the Arizona Supreme Court modified Richmond's death sen-
tence to life imprisonment without parole.24 The court based its
decision on Richmond's rehabilitation on death row, the possi-
bility of additional years of delay in the event that a new death
sentence was imposed, and certain changes in Arizona's capital
sentencing laws.s
D. DUNCAN PEDER MCKENZIE, JR.
In 1975, ajury convicted Duncan Peder McKenzie, Jr. of ag-
gravated kidnapping and deliberate homicide by means of tor-
ture. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and
sentence and rejected his numerous claims on appeal, including
his assertion that the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted
to him the burden of proving his state of mind . The United
States Supreme Court twice granted McKenzie's petitions for
certiorari and each time remanded the case to the Montana Su-
preme Court for further consideration." In 1980-its fourth re-
According to the Ninth Circuit:
A defendant must not be penalized for pursuing his constitutional rights, but he
also should not be able to benefit from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of those
rights. It would indeed be a mockery ofjustice if the delay incurred during the prosecu-
tion of claims that fail on the merits could itself accrue into a substantive claim to the
very relief that had been sought and properly denied in the first place. If that were the
law, death-row inmates would be able to avoid their sentences simply by delaying pro-
ceedings beyond some threshold amount of time, while other death-row inmates-less
successful in their attempts to delay---would be forced to face their sentences. Such dif-
ferential treatment would be far more "arbitrary and unfair" and "cruel and unusual"
than the current system of fulfilling sentences when the last in the line of appeals fails
on the merits. We thus decline to recognize Richmond's lengthy incarceration on
death row during the pendency of his appeals as substantively and independently viola-
tive of the Constitution.
Richmond, 921 F.2d at 950.
"State v. Richmond, 886 P.2d 1329 (Ariz. 1994).
n The court noted its "expectation and strong recommendation that he remain
incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life and never receive parole." Id. at
1338.
"State v. McKenzie, 557 P.2d 1023 (Mont. 1976).
7 The Court granted the first petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of the then-recently decided Pat-
terson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (due process not violated in requiring defen-
dant prove an affirmative defense). McKenzie v. Montana, 433 U.S. 905 (1977).
When the United States Supreme Court granted McKenzie's second petition for cer-
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view of the case on direct appeal-the Montana Supreme Court
ruled that any error regarding the jury instructions was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
28
McKenzie was then unsuccessful in each of his federal ha-
beas petitions. While litigating his first federal habeas corpus
petition, McKenzie discovered that a week after the jury verdict
and a month before his sentencing hearing, the trial prosecutor
had a forty-five minute ex parte meeting with the trial judge.2
He alleged in his second habeas petition that this meeting vio-
lated his rights under Gardner v. Florida.s° After holding a hear-
ing on the claim, in 1992, the federal district court ruled that
there was no credible proof that the 1975 conference could
have influenced the sentencing decision, and the Ninth Circuit
later affirmed that judgment!' In a third federal habeas peti-
tion filed on the eve of his execution, McKenzie challenged his
execution after his twenty-year stay on death row. He claimed,
on appeal from the district court's denial of his petition, that
the state should be held responsible for the almost fifteen-year
period in which no court proceeding was held to resolve the
Gardner claim. Montana countered that it should be considered
responsible only for five years and nine months of his twenty-
year stay on death row because that was the time his case had
tiorari, it vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in
light of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512 (1979) (due process violated when
jury instructed that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary conse-
quences of his voluntary acts" because it relieves prosecution of proving defendant's
intent and defendant is forced to rebut presumption), a case decided in the period
between his first and second certiorari petitions. McKenzie v. Montana, 443 U.S. 903
(1979).
See State v. McKenzie, 608 P.2d 428 (Mont. 1980).
' McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
so 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (due process violated when death sentence imposed on the
basis of information which defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain). Both
the prosecutor and judge should have been more conscientious. Even though
Gardner had not been decided, the Court had previously held that the sentencing
proceeding was a critical stage of the adjudication process to which a defendant was
entitled to the assistance of counsel. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). Thus
the absence of both the defendant and defense counsel should have made it apparent
that their meeting could raise serious legal questions. Ex parte conversations be-
tween the prosecutor and the judge have been the basis for granting of a habeas peti-
tion. See, e.g., Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1996).
3' See McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 89
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spent on direct appeal. The appellate panel dismissed the peti-
tion on procedural grounds, 2 and McKenzie was executed two
days later.
33
E. CLARENCE ALAN LACKEY
In 1983, Clarence Alan Lackey was retried, convicted and
sentenced to death for a killing that had occurred six years ear-
lier. In June, 1989, a divided Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the conviction and sentence.s The Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected Lackey's claim that Texas' special circum-
stances statute was unconstitutional because it did not provide a
carefully detailed instruction on the consideration of mitigating
evidence, such as the instruction he had proffered at trial, and
that the absence of such an instruction precluded the jury's ap-
propriate consideration of the mitigating evidence he submit-
ted.36 Lackey successfully moved for a rehearing. In May, 1991,
the Court of Criminal Appeals again affirmed the conviction
and death sentence. According to the majority, despite the
" See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1470 (9th Cir.), aff'd en banc, 57 F.3d 1493
(9th Cir. 1995).
" Bob Anez, Montana Executes Killer While He Listens to Music, PHOENrX GAZr=,
May 10, 1995, at AS.
Lackey's first conviction and death sentence for the murder were reversed be-
cause a prospective juror was removed from the jury pool after expressing reserva-
tions about the death penalty, without further inquiring into whether these views
were so strong that he would disregard the evidence and the law in deciding the case.
State v. Lackey, 638 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Grim. App. 1982).
3'State v. Lackey, 819 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Grim. App. 1989).
Quoting from a plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court, the ma-
jority concluded that the Court had already rejected Lackey's interpretation of the
Texas statute and that the trial court's instructions sufficiently guided the jury's de-
liberations. Id. at 118-20 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 171 (1988)
(plurality opinion)).
The dissent maintained that the majority had given undue weight to a passage in
the United States Supreme Court plurality opinion and that the majority's analysis
was not the application of the actual law, but was rather in anticipation of how the
Court would rule on a similar issue then pending before the United States Supreme
Court in Penty v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Lackey, 819 S.W.2d, at 122-23
(Clinton,J., dissenting).
'7 Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). This rehearing was
prompted by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989), which had been decided a day after the Court of Criminal Appeals'
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trial judge's failure to adopt Lackey's requested instruction, the
jury instructions did not prevent the jury from making an indi-
vidualized assessment of his character and background and giv-
ing a reasoned moral response on the appropriateness of the
death penalty for his crime.s
Lackey's first execution date was in July, 1992.'9 Twice the
execution date was changed to allow him to investigate and un-
successfully litigate a state habeas corpus petition. He was also
unsuccessful in a subsequent federal habeas petition, and a sec-
ond state habeas petition. Lackey then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, claiming that it was
cruel and unusual punishment for the state to execute him be-
cause of the seventeen-year delay between his conviction and
date of his proposed execution. Though the Court denied his
petition, Justice Stevens noted that the claim seemed an ideal
example of one that would benefit from further study in the
state and federal courts.40 Lackey's inordinate delay claim was
ultimately unsuccessful 4 1 and he was executed on May 20, 1997,
after nineteen years on death row.4
F. WILLIAM LLOYD TURNER
In 1978, William Lloyd Turner, an African -American, killed
a white store owner during a robbery. Duringjury selection, the
trial judge precluded Turner's counsel from questioning pro-
spective jurors on their attitudes about race. A jury convicted
Turner of capital murder and other charges, and sentenced him
to death. On appeal, he argued that the trial court's refusal to
affirmance. The Court's analysis in Penry was similar to Lackey's construction of the
law and contrary to the approach taken by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
38 Lackey, 819 S.W.2d at 134-35. Three judges dissented, arguing that the majority
had misinterpreted the existing case law to affirm the conviction and sentence, de-
spite the seeming uncertainty of the law upon which they rested. Id. at 139 (Clinton,
J., dissenting); id. at 141 (Baird, J., dissenting). Lackey's second motion for rehearing
was later denied. Id. at 128-41.
" The litigation history of Lackey's case is detailed in Lackey v. Scott, 885 F. Supp.
958, 962-64 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
" Lackey v. Scott, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (StevensJ, memorandum on the denial of
certiorari).
41 See Lackey v.Johnson, 83 F.3d 116 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 276 (1996).
12 Michael Graczyk, Murderer on Death Row for 19 Years is Executed for Lubbock Slaying,
AUSTINAMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 21, 1997, at B2.
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inquire into the issue of racial bias denied him a fair and impar-
tial jury. The state courts rejected that claim on direct appeal
and in post-conviction proceedings. In 1986, on federal habeas
review, the United States Supreme Court used his capital case to
apply standards developed in noncapital cases on inquiring into
the racial prejudice of prospective jurors. 3 The Supreme Court
remanded the case for further proceedings because it ruled that
Turner's right to select an impartial jury had been violated. Af-
ter a new sentencing hearing before a different jury, Turner re-
ceived another death sentence." He then began another round
of unsuccessful post-conviction proceedings in state and federal
court.45 In April, 1995, in his fourth federal habeas petition and
days before his scheduled execution, Turner alleged that after
fifteen years on death row, while confined under allegedly tor-
turous conditions, it was unconstitutional for the state to exe-
cute him.46 As in McKenzie, the federal appellate court dismissed
the petition on procedural grounds, and Turner was executed
the next day.47
G. JOSEJESUs CEJA
In 1976, Jose Jesus Ceja was convicted and sentenced to
death.48 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
and death sentence, concluding that the two murders were
"committed in an especially cruel, heinous and depraved man-
ner."49 Later, due to a change in the law,50 another sentencing
"Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). The trial judge refused the request, stat-
ing that it "had been ruled on by the Supreme Court," which may have been a refer-
ence to Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). Turner, 476 U.S. at 31 n.2. In Turner,
the Court ruled that Ristaino did not control, partly because Turner was being prose-
cuted for a capital offense. Id. at 33.
41 Turner v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 483 (Va. 1988).
Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994) (recounting litigation history and
affirming denial of federal habeas petition).
46 Turner v.Jabe, 58 F.3d 924 (4th Cir. 1995).
June Arney & Laura Lafay, Turner Executed After 15 Years, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(NORFOLK), May 26, 1995, at Al.
4This was Ceja's second trial and convictions for two killings. The first convic-
tions for the killings were reversed because of improper jury instructions and im-
proper admission of evidence. State v. Ceja, 546 P.2d 6 (Ariz. 1976).
State v. Ceja, 565 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Ariz. 1977).
1998]
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hearing was held, which again resulted in a death sentence for
Ceja.5 ' Ceja was unsuccessful in his state collateral proceedings,
as well as in a federal habeas petition.2 The day before his
scheduled execution, the Ninth Circuit rejected Ceja's motion
for permission to file a successive habeas petition in which he
asserted that because of his twenty-three-year stay on death row
his pending execution violated the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment.53 Ceja was exe-
cuted on January 21, 1998; his stay on death row is the longest
for any modem capital defendant.
54
H. SUMMARY
These seven cases-from different jurisdictions and arising
from prosecutions that began in the 1940s through the 1970s-
not only have the common feature that each defendant spent
an inordinate length of time on death row, but each case was
questionable as a capital prosecution. Even though each defen-
dant was sentenced to death, the state continued to argue in
support of the death penalty even after defects in the processing
and trial of the defendant were uncovered. Despite the defects
'0 The next year the state supreme court, after ruling that its capital sentencing law
was unconstitutional, ordered the resentencing of all of Arizona's capital defendants.
State v. Watson, 586 P.2d 1253 (Ariz. 1978).
" State v. Ceja, 612 P.2d 491 (Ariz. 1980).
52 Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 422 (1997).
In a partial dissent, one Ninth Circuit judge argued that the death sentence was im-
proper. Id. at 1255-59 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Her
principal concern was that the sole aggravating circumstance that was the basis for his
sentence had not been proven. Id. at 1255-56. The dissent noted that one month af-
ter Ceja's sentence was affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court first held that aggravat-
ing circumstances had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The dissent was
unwilling to presume that the state courts applied a legal standard that had yet to be
announced when they concluded that the aggravating circumstance had been estab-
lished. Id.
The dissent also maintained that the death sentence should not be affirmed be-
cause there was insufficient evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, be-
cause at the time of Ceja's sentencing the state courts had not narrowly construed the
language of the aggravating circumstance that was the basis for Ceja's death sentence,
and because the Arizona Supreme Court failed to determine independently whether
the death sentence was appropriate. Id. at 1257-61.
Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir. 1998).
Barry Graham, Curtains for Ceja, PHOENIX NEWTIMnEs, Feb. 5, 1998, at 15.
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in these cases, substitute trial proceedings were held only pur-
suant to an appellate court's order.
IM. PROCESSING OF CAPITAL CASES IN SELECTEDJURISDICTIONS
In addition to the above seven cases, the processing of capi-
tal cases in many states is flawed. This section reviews how capi-
tal cases are processed in California, Texas and Florida, the
states that have the most inmates on death row.55 This review
suggests that the capital litigation process itself presents many
occasions for delay that are neither necessary nor indispensable
for the adjudication or processing of the case.
A. CALIFORNIA
For many years California has had difficulty in finding quali-
fied lawyers willing to handle death penalty direct appeals; de-
fendants receive death sentences at a faster pace than the courts
can find lawyers to handle the existing cases. As of mid-1992,
seventy-three of California's 320 death row inmates did not have
legal representation.56 The California Appellate Project (CAP),
an agency created to enlist and advise lawyers in death penalty
cases, was given the responsibility of recruiting and appointing
counsel in capital cases. Prompted by criticism that CAP was
purposely moving slowly in appointing lawyers and that it was
approving only attorneys philosophically opposed to the death
penalty, in June, 1992 the California Supreme Court appointed
one of its administrative officers to the task. Despite the reas-
signment, by late 1993, 106 of the 375 death row inmates did
not have an attorney, and estimates were that the wait for coun-
57sel for some inmates could take up to four years. There are
" As of October 1, 1998, California had 513 inmates on death row, NAACP LEGAL
DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row U.S.A. 18 (Fall 1998) [hereinafter DEATH Row
U.S.A.], Texas had 436 capital defendants, id. at 43, and Florida had 387, id. at 23.
Philip Hager, Counselfor the Condemned, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1993, at 33.
17 Indeed, as of February 1, 1995, none of the 60 inmates that had arrived on death
row in the past three years had been assigned an appellate lawyer. Steve Albert, Con-
demned, Without Counsel, THE RECORDER, May 26, 1995, at 1. A more recent report
states that 136 of the 450 death row inmates are without legal representation. Mike
Kataoka, Lawyers Scarce as Death Row Cases Mount, PRESs-ENTEP RISE (Riverside, Cal.),
Sept. 21, 1996, at B1; see also David G. Savage, State's Legal Morass Numbs Death Penalty,
1998]
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several reasons for the lack of available attorneys. Eligible at-
torneys must have practiced four years, attended appellate train-
ing and handled at least seven appellate cases, including one
homicide. An additional source of possible delay is that years
may pass before the court reporter, court clerk, trial attorneys,
and trial judge review the transcript and certify it for appellate
review." Thus, it can take up to nine years before a capital de-
fendant's first appeal of right is perfected. Other obstacles in-
clude limits on the reimbursement of fees and expenses for
appellate attorneys, and the seeming difficulty in obtaining a re-
versal due to the state supreme court's high affirmance rate in
capital cases.5 9
B. TEXAS
As with many issues, capital punishment is sui generis in
Texas. ° Since 1976, Texas has executed the most capital defen-
dants in the United States.61 Texas routinely provides indigent
L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1998, at Al (detailing changes in California and federal laws that
have failed to speed up executions in California).
One issue raised by this delay between the conviction and the adjudication of the
direct appeal is whether the inmate's due process rights are violated. See generally
Marc M. Arkin, Speedy Criminal Appeal. A Right Without a Remedy, 74 MINN. L. REV. 437
(1990).
-" See Mack Reed, An Even Longer Wait onDeath Row, L. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, atAl.
'9 Aside from these important administrative issues, even if California is able to
timely appoint appellate counsel in capital cases, those attorneys will likely need some
inspiration for their role beyond the institutional perspective of providing an able de-
fense. Towards this end, Charles Ogletree has suggested that empathy and heroism
should be promoted in criminal defense organizations. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REV.
1239 (1993).
6o According to Brent Newton, there is "pervasive unfairness in the modern Texas
death penalty," including
inherent and overt racism, prosecutorial misconduct, hanging judges and hangingju-
ries, the crisis in providing indigent capital defense, the injustice of subjecting the
young and persons with serious mental disorders to capital punishment, and Texas' re-
cord of sending innocent persons to death row.
Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death Penalty, 1973-
1994, 1 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 2-3 (1994). See also AMNESIYIERNATIONAL, UNITED
STATES OF AmERCA: DEATH PENALTY IN TEXAS: LETHAL INJUSnCE (March 1998) [here-
inafter LETHAL INJUSTICE].
61 See DEATH ROW U.SA, supra note 55, at 14.
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capital defendants with a lawyer at trial and on direct appeal.
Until 1995, upon the conclusion of the appeal, a Texas death
row inmate generally had to "fac[e] death alone"62 because the
state did not have an organization that represented indigent
death row inmates and there was no state right to post-
conviction counsel. The lack of a post-conviction attorney is a
significant impediment because many defendants sentenced to
death have routinely had their death sentences reversed on col-
lateral attack.6 Thus, not providing post-conviction attorneys
increases the possibility that the state may execute a defendant
not truly deserving of death.
In the late 1980s, the number of unrepresented Texas death
row prisoners was increasing as the number of private attorneys
willing to represent these inmates began declining. The prob-
lem arose largely because Texas state trial judges rarely exer-
cised their discretion to appoint and compensate counsel in
state habeas proceedings. 64 Moreover, the state courts routinely
refused to grant stays of execution when the execution was im-
minent. In an apparent effort to facilitate executions, Texas
trial judges began setting execution dates only months after ei-
ther the denial of the last petition to appeal or the expiration of
'"The phrase is from Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney
Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. R-v. 513 (1988), which describes the issue on a na-
tional level and explores Florida's legislative approach to the issue.
See generalyJack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE LJ. 908, 918
(1982) (considering period between 1972 and 1982); James S. Liebman, More Than
"Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v.
Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537, 541 n.15 (1990-1991) (considering avail-
able material through July 1991); see also Karen M. Allen et al., Federal Habeas Corpus
and Its Reform: An Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 732-55 (1982).
According to the most recent figures, from 1992 to 1995, 1147 defendants were
sentenced to death; 156 executions occurred; 449 defendants were removed from
death row other than by execution (dismissal of indictment, reversal ofjudgment of
conviction, commutation, resentencing, an order of new trial or death) and the death
row population increased by 479 persons. In short, a defendant is nearly three times
as likely to be removed from death row for a reason other than the execution. U.S.
DEP'T OFJUST., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1996, at tbl. 6.67 (1997);
see also David Von Drehle, When Harry Met Scalia: Why the Death Penalty Is Dying, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 1994, at C3 (stating death row inmates have to fear old age more than
electrocution, gas chamber or lethal injection).




the time in which to file an appeal. This practice seemed to ex-
acerbate the difficulty capital inmates encountered in securing
pro bono representation because attorneys were generally reluc-
tant to volunteer to provide representation under the strain
created by a pending execution date.6 One consequence of this
entire process was that some unrepresented inmates faced the
prospect of being executed without availing themselves of either
state or federal post-conviction procedures. To forestall this
possibility and to preserve the right to challenge their convic-
tions and death sentences under the federal habeas corpus stat-
utes, Texas capital inmates began to seek stays of execution and
appointment of counsel from federal courts.
In 1990, a report prepared for the State Bar of Texas made
several recommendations, including paying private attorneys to
represent death row prisoners in state habeas proceedings, es-
tablishing an organization of full-time attorneys to represent
death row prisoners in state habeas proceedings, and having the
state courts defer issuing execution warrants until a prisoner
had completed one full round of state and federal habeas cor-
pus proceedings. 66 Neither the state legislature nor the courts
adopted these recommendations. The Texas Resource Center,
a Community Defender Organization authorized to provide
representation, assistance, and related services to eligible per-
sons in federal habeas corpus death penalty cases, tried to re-
cruit volunteer counsel and failing that, if the execution was
imminent, it helped the inmate in preparing and filing a per-
functory habeas petition in federal court. Accompanying the
petition often were motions for appointment of counsel and
stay of execution to allow appointed counsel sufficient time to
review the record, conduct appropriate research and investiga-
tion, and prepare a more thorough habeas petition. Inmates
stopped this practice in September, 1993, after a Texas federal
district judge treated a perfunctory petition as if it were a com-
plete petition, raising all the constitutional claims available to
the capital defendant. That district judge denied the petition
See generally Edith H. Jones, Death Penalty Procedures: A Proposal for Reform, 53 TF.X
BARJ. 850 (1990).
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 64, at 166-68.
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on the merits and the motion for a stay.67 The judge dismissed a
second habeas petition filed by that inmate, in part, as an abuse
of the writ. Inmates resumed the filing of perfunctory writs af-
ter McFarland v. Scott,68 a June, 1994 decision that gave a tor-
tured reading of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B), allowing the
appointment of and payment for counsel and other defense
services before the filing of a federal writ of habeas corpus.69
Since McFarland, Texas has changed its practice. In 1995,
the state reformed its habeas corpus laws. The 1995 legal
changes, however, cannot reduce the time that most Texas capi-
tal defendants have already spent on death row. Part of this
previous delay arose from the time that it takes for the ap-
pointment of counsel, both on direct appeals and in collateral
proceedings.71 The new laws provide for the appointment and
compensation of counsel in state habeas corpus proceedings.
Capital defendants now litigate their habeas corpus petitions
concurrent with their direct appeals.72 If at the conclusion of
both processes, the inmate has not obtained the requested re-
lief, he usually may then seek federal habeas corpus relief.73
There is no evidence that these reforms will appreciably reduce
the delay between the imposition of a death sentence and the
execution. Nor is there evidence that the legal changes will al-
low the courts meaningful appellate review of death sentences.
67 Gosch v. Collins, No. SA-93-CA-731 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 1993), aff'd, 8 F.3d 20
(5th Cir. 1993).
512 U.S. 849 (1994).
According to the majority, when an indigent capital defendant files a motion for
appointment of counsel before filing a legally sufficient habeas petition, the habeas
proceeding has "commenced" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2251, and the federal court
is authorized to order a stay of the execution. This practice was approved so the right
to counsel for capital defendants provided by 21 U.S.C. § 84 8(q) (4) (B) would not be-
come a nullity. The principle announced in McFarland has been incorporated into
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(h) (Supp. 1998).
70 See TEX. CODE CIUM. P. ANN. art. 11.071 (West 1998).
71 See Oral Argument at 36-37, McFarland v. Collins, No. 93-6497, 1994 WL 665012
(U.S. Mar. 29, 1994) (prosecutor asserted delay can vary from two to eight years for
appointment of counsel to capital cases).
"See generallyJames C. Harrington & Anne More Burnham, Texas'New Habeas Cor-
pus Procedure for Death-Row Inmates: Kafkaesque-and Probably Unconstitutiona4 27 ST.




From the laws' enactment until December, 1996 there were few
executions because the courts had to rule on legal challenges to
the law.74
C. FLOUDA
Like Texas and California, Florida is another state that has
been serious about prosecuting death-eligible defendants. After
Furman was decided, Florida was the first state to enact a death
penalty statute.75 The Court upheld that law in Proffitt v. Flor-
ida.76 By the mid-1980s the Florida Supreme Court had decided
more than 300 capital cases, which meant that there was a grow-
ing body of state death penalty law. As further evidence of its
commitment to capital punishment, Florida led the nation in
carrying out the death penalty in the post-Furman era: it was the
first state to commit a non-consensual execution-that is, the
defendant did not terminate his legal appeals-when it exe-
cuted John Arthur Spinkellink on May 25, 1979; and until 1986,
it had the largest number of defendants on death row and led
the nation in the number of executions.
The state was not always conscientious in respecting the
rights of capital defendants, however. Florida, which presently
has the third largest death row population, has had some diffi-
culty in finding adequate representation for indigent capital de-
fendants. It took until mid-1985 before Florida adopted a
formal system of providing counsel in post-conviction capital
cases. Before then inmates and concerned defense attorneys
had to find attorneys for these cases.78 From the mid-1970s until
the mid-1980s, the only formal mechanism for locating pro
74 See Christi Harlan, Law Stalls Death-Row Appeals, AusTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Apr. 11, 1996, at Al; Kathy Walt, Execution Pace Slows in Texas, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Aug. 10, 1996, at Al. After Ex Parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996),
upheld the laws against constitutional challenges, the moratorium ceased, and Texas
officials made up for lost time by executing several defendants in a relatively short pe-
riod of time. See Sue Anne Pressley, Texas Picks Up the Pace of Capital Punishment Con-
current State, U.S. Appeals Speed Process, WASH. POST, May 20, 1997, at A3.
7 See Mello, supra note 62, at 517.
76 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
' Mello, supra note 62, at 518.
7" Three of the five appellate defender offices in Florida handled post-conviction
capital representation. Id. at 559.
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bono lawyers for Florida death row inmates was the Florida
Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice.7 As in Texas, during the
1980s, in Florida the number of death warrants increased dra-
matically while the pool of available volunteer counsel de-
creased. Frequently, inmates were unrepresented when the
governor signed death warrants, setting an execution date. In
several cases, attorneys were forced to litigate the post-
conviction claims within short deadlines.ws In one instance a
Florida lawyer traveled to New York City and went from law firm
to law firm, seeking assistance for a case in which the execution
was in twelve days."1 One firm agreed, and, days later, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court reversed the death sentence.
s2
Prompted by litigation challenging the operation of the sys-
tem, and stays of two executions because of the inability to lo-
cate volunteer counsel, in 1985, the Florida legislature
established the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative
(CCR), to provide representation to Florida's death row in-
mates. 3 CCR's office opened in October 1985, employing a
capital representative and nine attorneys. Partly because some
private lawyers declined to continue representing capital in-
mates and because the governor signed more death warrants,
CCR's attorneys were soon overwhelmed. Nevertheless, critics
have claimed that CCR reduced the frequency of executions."4
" See id at 567-68. The Clearinghouse relied on contributions from private citi-
zens, religious groups, and foundations for financial support. It generally had a
three-person staff, none of whom were lawyers, and recruited and helped volunteer
counsel in capital cases already affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. See id. at 567.
"See Mello, supra note 62, at 569-85 (discussing six representative cases).
1 Saundra Torry, Lauyers Scramble to Fill Void in Death Row Appeals, WASH. PoST, July
24, 1988, at All.
$ Id.
"Mello, supra note 62, at 600.
4 Id. at 605-06. One critic has the opposite assessment-that CCR has made it pos-
sible for Florida to execute only nominally represented inmates. Michael Mello, an
early member of the Center's staff; has claimed that death row inmates who were rep-
resented by the Center were worse off than those who did not have legal representa-
tion. Mello suggests that Florida replace the Center with an entity that provides
logistical support for pro bono counsel. Michael Mello, Death and His Lawyers: Why
Joseph Spaziano Owes His Life to the Miami Herald--And Not to Any Defense Lawyer orJudge,




Other jurisdictions have faced issues similar to the ones
confronted by California, Texas, and Florida in the administra-
tion of the death penalty. For instance, in the early 1980s it
seemed that Missouri adopted a policy of scheduling executions
before capital defendants had availed themselves of federal
court review. That practice abated after Justice Blackmun de-
clared that a stay should issue in each case.85 In Pennsylvania,
which has a substantial death row population, a 1989 task force
reported that that state's capital litigation process had problems
86of major proportions. Delays marred Pennsylvania's capital
litigation process because there were too few lawyers with capital
expertise, and there was no mechanism for tracking capital
cases to monitor their progress.87
Prosecutors are responsible for some delay, too. Delay oc-
curs when courts have to consider issues that are not necessarily
germane to the defendant's guilt. One such example is the
time taken by courts in ruling on a state's motion to disqualify a
defense attorney from representing the defendant.ss On occa-
sion, prosecutors have litigated whether they have to release
public records and documents that a defendant seeks in order
to cast doubt on the investigation and prosecution of the case. 89
Prosecutors also allow cases to remain idle for long periods.
Sometimes, this idleness is because an office different from the
one that conducted the trial is responsible for the appeal or
post-conviction work.9° Court records, such as transcripts and
motions, are sometimes missing from court files and time is
See McDonald v. Missouri, 464 U.S. 1306 (Blackmun, CircuitJustice 1984).
See Bob Whittman, Legal Last Defense or Wasted Tax Dollars?, MORNING CALL
(Allentown, Pa.), May 14, 1995, at B1.
'7 Id. A more recent study asserts that in Philadelphia, African American defen-
dants are more likely than other defendants to be sentenced to death, even when the
circumstances of the killing are the same. Fox Butterfield, New Study Adds to Evidence
of Bias in Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, § 1, at 22.
See Penelope Lemov, Long Life on Death Row, GOVERNING, Mar. 1996, at 30.
"SeeJanet Elliott & Robert ElderJr., High Courts: DA 's Closed Files Ruled Exempt from
Open Records Disclosure, TEx. LAW., June 24, 1996, at 4; Alan Johnson, Executions are
Costly, Studies Find, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 2, 1995, at IA.
"See Andy Sher, Crime Fears, Death Penalty Debate Stirring Furor Over Judge Election,
NAsHrvLE BANNER, July 22, 1996, at Al.
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spent searching for replacement copies or reconstructing the
testimony.9' Delay also occurs when defense attorneys and
prosecutors, burdened by their caseload, seek extensions in
which to file their legal papers.92 Time also elapses before either
the retrial or resentencing of capital defendants whose prior
conviction or sentence has been reversed.9 In sum, the adver-
sarial nature of the death penalty process, the number of capital
cases and the lack of systematic oversight of the capital litigation
process foster delays.
After their direct appeals, death row inmates have little in-
centive to prod along the process of further judicial review. The
truth is that for the most part neither do most prosecutors.
Even those prosecutors who have ambitions beyond their pres-
ent office can rely on the number of death sentences imposed,
no matter the actual number of executions, to further their ca-
reers."4 Moreover, political considerations influence when, if
ever, the state tries to get the case moving toward execution.
Governors sign death warrants to show that they are "tough on
crime" or to spur the court or the parties into processing the
9, See, e.g., Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversal of 24-
year-old death sentence for new hearing because of ineffective assistance of counsel,
supported by once-stored court reporter's stenographic notes of defense attorney's
closing argument).
"Apparently it mattered to one federal judge whether the request for extensions
of time to file papers is made by the defendant or the state. In Madden v. Texas, 498
U.S. 1301, 1305 (Scalia, CircuitJustice 1991) Justice Scalia, as the CircuitJustice for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, declared that henceforth the
withdrawal of appellate counsel prior to the filing of a certiorari petition would not
automatically constitute sufficient "good cause" to extend the period in which to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari. Prosecutors, when asserting that their workload ne-
cessitates the extension of time, however, have obtained several extensions in which
to file their response. See Christine M. Wiseman, Repmenting the Condemned: A Citique
of capital Punishmen4 79 MARQ. L REV. 731, 749 (1996). This disparate treatment for
extensions of time to file court papers is perhaps defensible if one believes that the
prosecutor acts in the state's best interests. Similarly, for purposes of calculating the
period of inordinate delay, the time period of such extensions should be attributed to
the state.
See Tracy Thompson, Delays in Death Row Appeals Keep Inmates in Judicial Limbo,
ATLANTAJ. & CoNsT., Sept. 27, 1986, at Al.
See Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of DeathDeiding




case.95  These warrants often result in satellite litigation on
whether to stay the death warrant. Moreover, various state offi-
cials have to decide the number of executions that should oc-
cur, the time between executions, and the order of executing
the inmates. 6 It is thus incorrect to assume that the state is
ready and willing to execute any capital defendant once that
inmate has completed his direct or post-conviction challenges.
In actuality, there are two reasons for an inordinate delay be-
tween the imposition of a death sentence and an execution:
first, the state's failure to vigorously respect the rights of capital
defendants; second, the state's failure to carry out the execution
as aggressively as it sought and obtained the death sentence.
Death penalty cases receive the greatest amount of attention at
the beginning of the process-when the crime occurs and dur-
ing the trial-and at the end of the process-on the eve of exe-
cution. It is the time between these events during which the
complained-of delay occurs, and in which the case fades from
public discussion and concern.98
In short, despite the commitment of substantial resources
toward, and a fair amount of success in obtaining death sen-
tences, the states have not established effective post-trial capital
case processing systems. These defective processing systems are
the true cause of most of the delay in capital cases. The states
have had a difficult time developing a cadre of qualified trial
and appellate capital defense attorneys. In addition, few states
have a central authority or office responsible for monitoring
95 See CRMNALJUSTICE SECION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TOWARD A MOREJUST
AND EFFECnVE SYSTEM OF REvIEw IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES, A REPORT
CONTAINING THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING DEATH
PENALTY HABEAS CoRPus AND RELATED MATERIMALS FROM THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S PROJECT ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPus
119 (Ira Robbins, Project Director 1990).
Id. at 137 n.531.97 Rhonda Cook & Bill Rankin, The Death Game: Appea4 Counterappeal, Motion, Coun-
termotion-Carnying Out the Death Penalty Means Playing the System, But What About Jus-
tice2, ATLANTAJ. & CONsT.,July 23, 1995, at 1N.
'8 This is not a recent occurrence. See Leonard D. Savitz, A Study in Capital Punish-
ment, 49J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 338, 338 (1958) (reporting that since
1944 executions that occurred within a year of imposition of death sentence received
perfunctory newspaper coverage).
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and coordinating the processing of capital cases. As a result, the
processing of capital cases is haphazard and subject to the
machinations of lax prosecutors and litigious defendants.
IV. HABEAS CoRpus IssuEs
Though most capital prosecutions occur in the state court
system, federal habeas corpus has historically served an impor-
tant role in the capital litigation process.9 Capital defendants
can obtain federal habeas court review of their convictions and
sentences by alleging that their detention violates the federal
Constitution. If the federal court concludes that the defen-
dant's federal rights were violated, it issues the writ, ordering
the state by a certain time to either conduct appropriate pro-
ceedings or to release the defendant. Accordingly, a capital de-
fendant who has been on death row for an inordinate period of
time would have to allege that his pending execution violates
the Constitution. Although it is presently unclear under the re-
cently amended federal habeas corpus statute whether an inor-
dinate delay claim is cognizable, and, if so, in which federal
forum, the issue should be cognizable to ensure that the death
penalty is not meted out for murders and murderers for whom
such a penalty is excessive, and that the death penalty is admin-
istered within the rule of law.1°° This Part outlines the federal
habeas law under which most inordinate delay claims will arise.
I will show that in certain instances the inordinate delay claim
should be cognizable, and that some defendants should have a
substitute sentencing hearing once they have been on death row
for an inordinate length of time.
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Since the founding of this nation until the mid-twentieth
century, the law of federal habeas corpus was captured in a few
" Most notably, a high percentage of capital convictions and sentences have been
reversed on habeas review. Seesources cited in note 63.
"' ArthurJ. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penally Unconstitu-
tiona4 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1784-98 (1970); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 844-47
(1969); MargaretJane Radin, TheJurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1047-64 (1978).
1998]
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statutes and many more federal court decisions interpreting
those laws. The first Judiciary Act authorized the issuance of
habeas petitions.'0 1 Though its reach was twice broadened by
Congress, 2 the most expansive extension of the statute oc-
curred in 1867, when the statute was amended to cover prison-
ers detained by state officials.0 3 Under the 1867 amendments, a
federal court could examine the legality of the prisoner's deten-
tion and if the detention was found to be in violation of the fed-
eral Constitution or laws, the court could order the release of
the prisoner. The courts interpreted the 1867 amendments as
authorizing habeas courts to conduct an inquiry into both the
factual and legal bases for the prisoner's detention.' 4 During
the next ninety-nine years, and with one relatively minor statu-
tory amendment, 10 5 the federal courts interpreted the writ as be-
ing functionally more available. These courts typically used the
pretense that the prisoner was essentially challenging the trial
court's jurisdiction. In 1942, the Court quit "kissing the juris-
dictional book" as a prerequisite to the availability of the writ,'0°
and subsequent cases explicitly established that the writ was
available to determine whether the state court process satisfied
the standards that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed on the
states."° Ajudicially created rule of comity was codified in 1948
by Congress' requirement that prisoners present the federal
101 FirstJudiciary Act. ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
10 The federal courts were twice granted authority to issue the writ to a limited
class of state prisoners. See Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632 (authorizing
habeas jurisdiction for prisoners confined for acts committed "in pursuance of a law
of the United States"); Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (authorizing habeas
jurisdiction for prisoners in United States or state custody who are citizens of a for-
eign state). See also Ex parteDorr, 44 U.S. 103 (1845) (federal courts cannot issue writ
to release state prisoner).
" °Judiciary Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867).
'0 See Max Rosenn, The Great Wit-A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OI-o ST. LJ.
337, 341 (1983).
10. Between 1911 to 1925 circuit court judges lacked the authority to grant the writ
without being specially assigned to a district court. See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255,
271 (1923). This was corrected by theJudiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 940 (1925).
'0' See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 151 (1970).
17 PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WEcHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CoURTs AND TnE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1502 (3d ed. 1988).
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claim to the state courts or "exhaust their state court remedies"
before applying for habeas relief.08 Exhaustion occurs by pre-
senting the constitutional claim to the state courts at least once,
provided there is a process by which the prisoner can raise the
claim.'J 9
From about 1953 to 1976 the Court interpreted the habeas
laws in an expansive manner, broadening the scope and avail-
ability of the writ. During this period the Court virtually elimi-
nated most procedural impediments to the relitigation of the
manner by which state prisoners were prosecuted. 0 A peti-
tioner could file more than one habeas petition and generally
have the courts adjudicate the merits of the claims in his or her
petition. The prisoner also did not have to worry about having
'08 Act ofJune 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, 964-68 (codifying exhaustion requirement at
28 U.S.C. § 2254). See general!y Larry W. Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Ha-
beas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to First Principles, 44 OHIo ST. L. J. 393, 401-13
(1983).
' Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-50 (1953) (plurality opinion). If no such pro-
cedure exists, then the exhaustion requirement is excused and the prisoner can raise
the claim in the federal habeas court.
"0 Brown established that a federal habeas court is not to attach any significance to
the United States Supreme Court's denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari contain-
ing the same constitutional claims; that principles of resjudicata did not apply to the
state court's findings; and that if the state courts provided a process for the develop-
ment of facts underlying the claim, the habeas court could rely on the trial and appel-
late court records in deciding whether to grant the writ, provided that there was not a
"vital flaw" in the state court process. See also Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S.
345, 351-53 (1973) (petitioner released on own recognizance with collateral conse-
quences for violating court order is "in custody"); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99
(1963) (petitioner's failure to avail himself of an available state court process could
not serve as an independent and adequate ground precluding federal habeas review,
unless petitioner had "deliberately by-passed" the state court process), oven'uled in part
by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (discussed in note 111, infra); Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (habeas court should adjudicate the merits of claims
raised in a second or successive petition unless determination in prior petition was on
the merits and the same grounds were presented; if earlier claims had not been re-
jected on the merits, or if a different claim is now presented, then habeas court
should address the merits of claims in second or successive petition, unless it finds
that the petitioner has abused the writ); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 241-42
(1963) (expanding notion of "in custody" requirement to cover petitioner on parole).
Rarely did Congress respond to the Courtes various interpretations of the habeas
laws. The notable exception was in 1966, when Congress prescribed when evidentiary
hearings should be held, which was somewhat different from the ircumstances out-
lined in Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313, and Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15-18. See Act of Nov. 2,
1966, 80 Stat. 1105.
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his or her claims precluded by prior state court factual or legal
determinations. Starting in 1977, the Court consistently began
to reinterpret the writ, insisting more on giving preclusive effect
to state court rules and the finality of state court convictions,
without similarly overruling its precedents that had expansively
interpreted the writ."' In this period the Court placed the bur-
den on the petitioner to show that the federal court should ad-
dress the merits of claims asserted in a second or successive
petition,"2 and considered giving more deferential review to
state court legal rulings. Just as importantly, during this pe-
riod, more than half of all capital defendants had their convic-
tions or sentences reversed on federal habeas review.
114
For the most part, by 1990, there were only two substantive
limitations on the availability of the writ. First, under Stone v.
.The primary cases, in chronological order, were Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977) (requiring that petitioner establish "cause" and "prejudice" arising there-
from as test for failing to comply with state procedural rule; failure to satisfy test per-
mits state procedural rule to serve as an independent and adequate ground for the
judgment, precluding federal habeas review of federal claim); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509 (1982) (court should dismiss entire petition when it contains both exhausted and
unexhausted claims); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (repeated rejections of simi-
lar claims or undeveloped legal theory are not cause for not employing state court
procedure); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (to constitute prejudice, peti-
tioner must show actual and substantial disadvantage infecting entire trial arising
from trial error); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986) (counsel's error, short of
ineffective assistance, does not constitute cause for procedural default); Kuhlmann v.
WilFon, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (successive writ should be reviewed only when peti-
tioner "supplements his claim with colorable showing of factual innocence");
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991) (petitioner must establish cause and
prejudice or show fundamental miscarriage ofjustice to overcome claim of abuse of
writ when filing second or successive habeas petition).
After 1990, the Court has been more willing to overrule its habeas precedents,
when giving greater deference to state court criminal decisions. See Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (petitioner must show cause and prejudice for fail-
ure to develop material fact in state court proceedings, with "narrow exception"
where he can show fundamental miscarriage ofjustice resulting from failure to con-
sider claim) (overuling in part Townsend); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)
(failure to utilize state court procedural rules bars federal habeas court review unless
petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice for failure to consider the claim or
demonstrate miscarriage ofjustice).
1 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
1' Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 295 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("We need not de-
cide such far-reaching issues in this case.").
' Seesources cited in note 63.
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Powel"5 Fourth Amendment violations were not cognizable on
habeas if the state court system provided a full and fair oppor-
tunity for the resolution of Fourth Amendment claims. Second,
Teague v. Lane"6 held that prisoners could not rely on a "new
rule" of constitutional law to collaterally attack their criminal
convictions. A legal ruling is new "if the result was not dictated
by precedent existing at the time the [habeas petitioner]'s con-
viction became final.""' 7 The new rule would apply retroactively
"if it places certain kinds of primary private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authorities to pro-
scribe""" or if it "establishes new procedures without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished."' 9
In 1996, the habeas corpus laws were amended in several re-
spects by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA). The extent of change wrought by the amend-
ments is unclear because Congress employed language different
from that used in the Court's decisions that seemed to address
similar principles. 20
B. ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALiYACT
The AEDPA amends §§ 2241 to 2255 of Title 28, governing
federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state and federal pris-
oners. Sections 2241 to 2255, among other things, allow for ex-
pedited review of the habeas petition and restrict the federal
court's scope of review of the merits of the habeas petition.
12
.. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
116 489 U.S. 288, 306-08 (1989).
"17 Id. at 301.
"a Id. at 307.
119 Id.
'" The growing commentary explores this issue from several perspectives. See, e.g.,
Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337 (1997);
Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User's Man-
ual, 51 VAND. L. REv. 103 (1998); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and
Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act 47 DUKE J. 1 (1997); Larry W. Yackle, Developments in Habeas
Corpus, Parts I-I, THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 1997, at 14; Nov. 1997, at 16; Dec. 1997,
at 16.
"' See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2264, 2254(e) (Supp. 1998).
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The AEDPA also, added §§ 2261 to 2266 to Title 28, which
deal with habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners who
have been sentenced to death122 in states that have certain state
post-conviction procedures.ss To take advantage of the expe-
dited review provisions, states have to either establish mecha-
nisms for the appointment, compensation and payment of
reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in state
post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent capital prison-
ers or allow indigent prisoners to litigate on direct review claims
that previously could be raised only in collateral attacks.124 The
prisoner is required to file a habeas petition, subject to certain
tolling provisions, "not later than 180 days after final State court
affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 12 One con-
sequence of not complying with the limitations period is that
any late-filed petition is treated as if it were a second or a succes-
sive petition rather than an initial petition. 6 In such instances,
the petitioner must first obtain an order from the appropriate
court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the
late-filed petition.12 7 Also, federal district courts have to dispose
'" This is the first time that Congress has distinguished between capital and non-
capital habeas corpus cases.
'2 Sections 2261 to 2266 apply only if a state "opts in" and qualifies under either
the post-conviction procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2261 or under the "unitary re-
view" process described in 28 U.S.C. § 2265. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261(a) (Supp. 1998).
124 See id. §§ 2261 (a)-(b), 2264(a).
12 Id §§ 2263(a)-(b), 2265(c). In return for the accelerated review of habeas peti-
tions, an automatic stay of execution issues with the filing of the petition. The stay
terminates if a timely habeas petition is not filed; the prisoner waives the right to pur-
sue habeas corpus review; or the prisoner fails to make a substantial showing of the
denial of his federal right or is denied habeas relief. See iL § 2262(b)-(c).
' See id. § 2262(c).
The court of appeals may issue an order authorizing the petition only if the pe-
titioner makes a prima facie showing that the claim:
(A) ... relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on col-
lateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previ-
ously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but
for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense.
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of habeas petitions within prescribed time limits.'8 If the dis-
trict court's judgment is appealed, the court of appeals must is-
sue a final decision "not later than 120 days" after the filing of
the last appellate brief.'2
The key substantive provisions of the AEDPA are §§ 2254
and 2264. Section 2254 applies to (1) all noncapital habeas pe-
titions filed by state prisoners after April 24, 1996, its date of en-
actment; and (2) capital habeas petitions that were pending on
April 24, 1996 in jurisdictions that have been deemed to have
satisfied the "opt in" requirements.'" Section 2264 applies to all
capital petitions filed after April 24, 1996 in "opt in" jurisdic-
tions, and it incorporates by reference the standards imposed by
§ 2254(a), (d)-(e).
A district court can consider only claims in the petition that
have been raised and decided on the merits in the state
courts.' As to cognizable claims, the writ cannot issue unless
the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established federal law, as deter-
mined by the United States Supreme Court, or the decision
denying the writ was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2) (Supp. 1998).
"' The district court is required to "render a final determination and enter a final
judgment on any application for a writ of habeas corpus brought under this chapter
in a capital case not later than 180 days after the date on which the application is
filed." Id. § 2266(b) (1) (A). The district court may extend this time period, once, for
30 days, for specified reasons. See id. § 2266(c) (i)-(iii). The district court is required
to give priority to capital habeas petitions "over all noncapital matters." Id. § 2266(a).
If the district court does not comply with the time limitations, the state may apply for
writ of mandamus from the appellate court, which has to be acted on within 30 days
of its filing. See id. § 2266(b) (4) (B).
"' See id. § 2266(c) (1) (A). The court of appeals has 30 days to decide whether to
grant a petition for rehearing or request for rehearing en banc and, if rehearing is
granted, must render a final decision "not later than 120 days after the date on which
the order granting rehearing or rehearing en banc is entered." Id. §
2266(c) (1) (B) (i)-(ii). The state may apply to the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of mandamus to enforce the time limitations governing review by the appellate
court. See id. § 2266(c) (4) (B).
1 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2.7a-b (2d ed. Supp. 1997).
' See 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a) (Supp. 1998).
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proceeding.8 2 Claims that have not been decided on the merits
in state courts can be litigated if the previous failure to raise the
claim was because (1) of state action in violation of federal law;
(2) the United States Supreme Court has recognized a new fed-
eral right that has been made retroactively applicable; or (3) the
claim is based on factual information that could not have been
discovered though due diligence in time to present the claim• .• 133
for prior state or federal post-conviction consideration.
In limited instances the habeas court can hold an eviden-
tiary hearing. It may do so to develop the factual basis of the
claim, if the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law that
the United States Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases
on collateral review, T3 or when the factual predicate could not
have been previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence and the facts underlying the claim are sufficient to es-
tablish by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitu-
tional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense."'
"' See idL §§ 2264(b), 2254(d).
'" See ia. § 2264.
131 See id. § 2264(a) (2).
. See id. § 2254(e) (2). Requiring the petitioner to prove that he is not guilty of
the underlying offense is inappropriate for capital cases because it does not provide
for consideration of both the guilt and sentencing proceedings. See Sawyer v. Whitley,
505 U.S. 333, 356 (1992) (Blackmun,J., dissenting); id. at 368 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
A death verdict is ordinarily the product of several factors. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 223-24 (1989);-Wil-
liam S. Geimer &Jonathan Amsterdam, WhyJurors Vote for Life orDeath: Operative Fac-
tos in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRM. L. 1, 53 (1988); Lawrence T.
White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Tria 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 113
(1987). Moreover, it is generally impossible to isolate the factors that resulted in a
death sentence because even though a defendant could be within the class of persons
who may be sentenced to death, a sentencer could still exercise mercy and not return
with a death sentence. Calf/ornia v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), has been read as
permitting sentencing on this basis. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185-88
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from
Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CoRNET! L. REV. 989, 992 (1996) (arguing sen-
tencing phase of capital trial ought to incorporate mercy).
Indeed, a failure to consider both the question of culpability for the offense and
the "death eligibility" of the defendant increases the risk that a death sentence may
be imposed on a defendant not deserving of death. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of
Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Pen-
alty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21, 25 n.10, 79-85 (1997).
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The procedural and substantive changes in the AEDPA will
make it more difficult for capital prisoners to obtain federal ha-
beas corpus relief. 1 6 A capital defendant asserting an inordinate
"6 It is questionable whether the AEDPA will apply to all capital cases. A court
might rule that the AEDPA is "inapplicable to cases in which it would upset reliance
interests in prior law" because it modifies the elements of a federal claim for relief or
establishes a new defense to such a claim. Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas
Corpus Statute, 44 BurnALo L. REV. 381, 404 n.78 (1996). If a court determines that
the standards outlined in the AEDPA do not apply to a petition asserting an inordi-
nate delay claim, the petition would have to be judged under the pre-AEDPA habeas
law.
Under pre-AEDPA habeas law, a petitioner would first have to convince the federal
court that the nonretroactivity rules of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), are not a
bar to the federal court's consideration of the inordinate delay claim. The petitioner
should be able to overcome this limitation. The Court has held that a ruling preclud-
ing a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants, based on their status
or the nature of the offense, falls under the first exception to Teague. See Penry v. Ly-
naugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329 (1989) (considering, on federal habeas review, whether
mentally retarded capital defendants can be executed). Similarly, the contention that
the substantive principles of the Eighth Amendment prohibit the execution of capital
defendants who have spent an inordinate amount of time on death row calls for a de-
termination of whether these inmates should, as a class, be exempted from execution.
The petitioner might also have to overcome the successive writ and abusive writ
doctrines. Under the successive writ doctrine a federal habeas court will not consider
claims that could have been raised in an earlier petition. See Saurjer, 505 U.S. at 338. A
capital defendant cannot raise an inordinate delay claim until it ripens, which occurs
only after the defendant has been on death row for an excessive period. This ripe-
ness requirement serves to ease the feared friction between state criminal law en-
forcement processes and the review of those processes by federal judges because the
federal judges acquire authority to review long-delayed death penalty cases only after
a substantial lapse of time. Conceivably, by this point, state officials will have had sev-
eral opportunities to review the case. Moreover, the constitutional and prudential
principles of Article III-such as the prohibition against a litigant's raising another's
legal claim, the rule barring the litigation of general grievances that are better ad-
dressed in the other branches of government and the requirement that the gravamen
of the complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked--dic-
tate that the petitioner can bring the claim only after he has suffered a distinct injury.
SeeAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
The abuse of the writ doctrine "defines the circumstances in which federal courts
decline to entertain a claim presented for the first time in a second or subsequent pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus." McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991). As
with the successive petition doctrine, the concerns that prompted the abuse of the
writ doctrine are less prevalent when habeas courts consider inordinate delay claims.
If the death row inmate could not raise the claim in an earlier habeas petition-be-
cause, for instance, he had not been on death row for the presumptive period-then
the abuse of the writ doctrine should not bar consideration of the merits of the peti-
tion, as the inmate, in raising the issue later, is raising the claim at the appropriate
time. Another procedural bar that might be raised is whether Rule 9 of the Rules
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delay claim is likely to argue that his or her pending execution
violates the Constitution, specifically, the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.1 3 7 The ha-
beas petition would essentially challenge the basis on which the
death sentence was imposed. As I have argued elsewhere, under
the test established by the United States Supreme Court, this ar-
gument does have merit13 Most importantly, the delay in carry-
ing out the death sentence may indicate that going forward with
the execution at this late date would not achieve a valid pe-
nological purpose.
Due to the present administration of capital punishment,
my suggested prerequisite that the prisoner show that an inor-
dinate length of time has been spent on death row-that is,
twice the national average-and the short filing periods estab-
lished by the AEDPA, it is highly unlikely that in a first habeas
petition a petitioner will be able to allege that there has been an
inordinate delay in his or her case."'9 Consequently, under the
AEDPA the petitioner will have to convince the appropriate
Governing Section 2254 Cases has been violated. The concerns emanating from Rule
9-intentional delay by the petitioner, prejudice to the state in defending the claim,
and the possibility that the claim could have been discovered earlier-are generally
addressed when considering whether the petition is successive or abusive and there-
fore independent analysis is unnecessary. Nonetheless, a first habeas petition cannot
be automatically dismissed due to the passage of time from the commission of the
crime to the filing of the petition. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996).
To overcome either the successive petition or abuse of the writ defense, a habeas
petitioner has to establish either (1) cause for not raising the claim earlier and preju-
dice as a result of that failure; or (2) that a miscarriage ofjustice would occur by re-
fusing to consider the underlying claim. An inordinate delay claim satisfies the cause
requirement due to the novelty of the claim. Previously, there has been little chance
of success of the claim. See 2 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 130, § 28.3c at 921-23.
The petitioner is prejudiced because he or she is not able to litigate the appropriate-
ness of his or her pending execution after an inordinate delay. See United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
Defaulted claims and claims in otherwise abusive or successive petitions can be
considered to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice. As detailed infra, capital defendants
have the equivalent of newly discovered evidence based on their lengthy death row
stay, which qualifies as a narrow exception to proving that they are "innocent of a
death sentence." See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 368.
,17 28 U.S.C. §§ 2264(b), 2254(a) (Supp. 1998).
'3 Aarons, supra note 1, at 205.
But see White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996) (under pre-AEDPA law de-
nying, without ordering evidentiary hearing, first federal habeas petition, which as-
serted that 17-year stay on death row was unconstitutional).
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court of appeals that the factual predicate for the claim could
not have been discovered previously through the exercise of
due diligence and that the facts underlying the claim, if proven
and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, are sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a consti-
tutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense.40
C. NEWLYDISCOVERED EVIDENCE UNDERMINING DEATH SENTENCE
The most frequently articulated rationale for not consider-
ing the inordinate delay claim pre-AEDPA is that the death sen-
tence was proper when it was imposed.14 1 This same reason is
likely to surface under the AEDPA, particularly when a court re-
lies on § 2264(a)-the claim was not raised in a prior state pro-
ceeding-as the basis for not considering the claim. However,
due to his or her inordinate stay on death row, the petitioner is
now in possession of newly discovered evidence that may un-
dermine the validity of the death sentence. Therefore, the capi-
tal prisoner is entitled to a hearing on whether his or her death
sentence is in violation of federal law.
In a subsequent or late filed first habeas petition, a capital
petitioner has to rely on § 2264(a) (3) to establish that the fac-
tual predicate for asserted claims could not have been estab-
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a) (3) (Supp. 1998). Alternatively, a capital defendant can
petition the United States Supreme Court under § 2241, asserting that his or her
pending execution violates the Constitution and that the Court should announce a
new rule of constitutional law that retroactively applies to cases on collateral review.
See id. §§ 2241, 2264(a) (2).
141 See, e.g., Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim based
on 15-year delay because of lack of precedent in prisoner's favor and under abuse of
writ doctrine); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim based on
17-year delay between trial and proposed execution date under abuse of writ doc-
trine); Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim based on 12-year
delay from conclusion of direct appeal); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th
Cir. 1995) (rejecting 17-year delay under abuse of writ doctrine and that there were
insufficient facts to warrant a hearing); United States ex rel. DelVecchio v. Illinois
Dep't. of Corrections, 1995 WL 688675 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1995) (relying on Free to re-
ject claim based on 16-year delay).
State courts presented with the issue have summarily ruled against the defendant.
See, e.g., Porter v. State, 653 So. 2d 374, 380 (Fla. 1995); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272,
1287-88 (Mont. 1996); State v. McKenzie, 894 P.2d 289, 293 (Mont. 1995); Stafford v.
State, 899 P.2d 657, 660 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
1998]
DWIGHT AARONS [Vol. 89
lished with the exercise of due diligence and that but for a con-
stitutional error the petitioner would not have been convicted of
the offense.142 This standard addresses only the guilt phase of
the capital trial; consequently it is an open question whether §
2264(a) (3) eliminates the "innocent of death" exception to suc-
cessive or abusive petitions and otherwise defaulted claims.
143
Conceivably, it does not. If the United States Supreme Court's
prior approaches to interpreting the AEDPA are indicative,4
the federal courts are to apply a "commonsense practice to the
statutory scheme."'4
Habeas courts considering "innocent of death" claims focus
on the aggravating circumstances or other conditions of death
eligibility.14 To obtain federal habeas review in an inordinate
142 28 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (3) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
" Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (petitioner entitled to relief if she can
show by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error at sentencing
hearing reasonable juror would not have imposed death sentence).
" See Hohn v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1969 (1998) (Supreme Court can review
denial of application for certificate of appealability in § 2255 cases by writ of certio-
rari); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618 (1998) (petition containing previ-
ous claim dismissed as premature is not barred as a second or successive petition
under § 2244(b) when asserted later when ripe); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320
(1997) (AEDPA does not apply to noncapital cases filed before its date of enactment);
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658-62 (1996) (Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to
entertain original habeas petitions under § 2241, notwithstanding AEDPA's other
limitations on availability of habeas petitions); see also Kimberly Woolley, Note, Consti-
tutional Interpretations of the Antiterrorism Act's Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 414 (1998) (suggesting AEDPA should be interpreted to avoid serious consti-
tutional questions); Note, The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions and the Preservation
ofJudicial Review: Federal Court Treatment of the New Habeas Provisions, 111 HARv. L. REv.
1578 (1998) (discussing federal court's interpretation of AEDPA).
14' Hohn, 118 S. Ct. at 1971; see also West Va. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01
(1991) ("Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we
construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and com-
fortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law. We do so not
because that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers must have had in
mind.., but because it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the cor-
pusjuris.") (citation omitted).
46 Professor Stephen Garvey has provided a useful schema for analyzing "innocent
of death" claims. Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law of Habeas Corpus, 56
ALB. L. REv. 225 (1992). He divides the concept into two categories: death-
ineligibility and "desert innocence." Desert-innocence claims explore the moral ap-
propriateness of sentencing the defendant to death, whereas death-ineligibility cases
focus on the legal prerequisites for a death sentence. Id. at 244-45. A case falls within
the death-ineligibility category if there is insufficient evidence that the defendant
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delay case, the inmate could contend that he is in possession of
newly discovered or otherwise unavailable evidence he could
not have raised at his trial or in a prior habeas petition. The
newly discovered evidence is his post-sentence conduct. It is
newly discovered or otherwise unavailable evidence because the
inmate's conduct on death row did not exist when the sentencer
imposed the death sentence. Each day that the inmate spent on
death row, this evidence was not only developing, but it also was
becoming more relevant and probative of the moral inappro-
priateness of the death penalty. The inmate might proffer to
the habeas court his prison disciplinary record to substantiate
his adjustment to prison and to show that a sentence other than
death sufficiently punishes him. Provided the inmate can estab-
lish that this newly discovered or otherwise unavailable evidence
has some bearing on the inappropriateness of the death sen-
tence-that is, there was a federal constitutional error in the
capital sentencing proceeding that prevented the sentencer
from rendering an accurate sentence-federal habeas courts
must hold a hearing on the merits of the constitutional claim.1' 7
committed the capital crime or insufficient evidence to establish the required aggra-
vating circumstances warranting a death sentence. Id. at 243-44. The desert-
innocence category is broader. It includes death-ineligibility cases and cases in which
defendants assert that they are innocent of death. Id. at 244. Federal courts ought to
focus on the desert-innocent component when adjudicating claims of capital defen-
dants who assert that they are "innocent of death." This would have the salutary ef-
fect of ensuring that the moral issue of 'Just desert," which is the essence of
retribution, is considered.
Inordinate delay petitioners would likely assert desert-innocence-type claims. They
might argue that in securing the death sentence, the prosecution sought to establish
that executing the defendant best served the state's penological interests, as opposed
to a sentence other than death. In concluding that a death sentence was the appro-
priate punishment, the sentencer was led to believe that at some date in the future
the execution would occur. Thus, the prosecution misled the sentencer as to the fu-
ture, namely, that the defendant would not spend twice the period of other executed
capital inmates. In submitting this false or misleading information to the sentencer,
the state corrupted the sentencer's consideration of the appropriateness of the death
sentence.
'47 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2) (Supp. 1998). See also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298
(1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 298,
317 (1963). In making this determination, the judge's consideration will include the
number of aggravating circumstances that were proven, the strength of those aggra-
vating circumstances, and whether the sentencer was required to weigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances against the proven mitigating circumstances. This would all be
appropriate to ensure that the death sentence would be the appropriate "reasoned
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The defendant probably will argue that the sentencer relied on
false or misleading information when it decided to impose the
death sentence.148 That is, the prosecution persuaded the sen-
tencer that nothing less than a death sentence was necessary to
adequately punish the defendant. The state, in continuing to
rely on this evidence, the probative value of which has now been
seriously undermined by the defendant's exemplary conduct on
death row, commits an error of sufficient constitutional magni-
tude to invalidate the death sentence."4 Adequate proof of a
moral response." See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
i'justice Douglas once noted:
It is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the use of testimony known by the prose-
cution to be perjured offends due process. While the petition did not allege that the
prosecution knew that petitioner's codefendants were lying when they implicated peti-
tioner, the State now knows that the testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner
was false. No competent evidence remains to support the conviction. Deprivation of a
hearing under these circumstances amounts in my opinion to a denial of due process of
law.
Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)); see also Sanders v.
Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1988).
141 SeeJohnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (death sentence vacated because
sentencer relied on aggravating factor later determined to be inaccurate); cf. Dugger
v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989) (suggesting that capital habeas petitioner's
procedural default would be excused if defendant demonstrated he was actually in-
nocent of death). As Bruce Ledewitz notes, Dugger "seems to concede that [improp-
erly instructing the jury] is the kind of error that 'might' lead to a death sentence for
a defendant who would not have received death without the error and perhaps does
not deserve it, but [the Dugger majority] insists that the defendant must show that this
in fact occurred... " Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valvefor Innocence, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 415, 437 (1990-1991); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447,476-77 (1984) (Stevens,J., concurring).
Commentators who addressed the issue before Whitley v. Sawyer, 505 U.S. 333
(1992), were confident that the habeas court should be able to hear the merits of the
claim. SeeJ. Skelly Wright & Abraham D. Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prison-
ers: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE LJ. 895, 958 n.223 (1966) ("It is
arguably a violation of due process if the state refuses to vacate a conviction entirely
based upon evidence later shown to be untrue, though not necessarily suppressed or
withheld. In effect, there is no probative evidence left supporting such convictions.");
Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 322-24 (1988); Ledewitz,
supra, at 440-49; Bruce S. Ledewitz, Procedural Default in Death Penalty Cases: Fundamen-
tal Miscarriage offustice and Actual Innocence, 24 CraM. L. BULL. 379, 421-23 (1988). See
also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963); Friendly, supra note 106, at 151-52.
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desert-innocence claim 50 would provide additional support for
the defendant's contention that the first death sentencing hear-
ing was legally inadequate.
The post-sentencing conduct of several death row inmates
suggests that a sentence less than death would have been suffi-
cient to punish those defendants. Moreover, the post-
sentencing lives of these defendants suggest that a death row
inmate can undergo a character metamorphosis, despite his or
her confinement on death row. Consider the case of Paul
Crump.' 2 Crump had an ornery temperament during his early
years of incarceration. That attitude began to change when
Crump came to believe that Jack Johnson, the new warden, was
serious about treating death row inmates with a measure of dig-
nity. After that, Crump sought out the prison chaplains, began
to work on his formal education, and tried to understand the
world and his role in it. In February 1958, Illinois abolished its
death row. Crump then supervised the convalescent tier of the
new jail hospital. According to one guard, Crump became
"mother, father, priest and social worker" to fifty inmates, in-
cluding problem prisoners and inmates who needed protection
from other prisoners.' Throughout this time, Crump contin-
ued to challenge the procedure by which he was convicted. In
1962, WardenJohnson said,
" Garvey, supra note 146.
. See Royal Brightbill, Why Does a Pardon Still Elude 'The Most Rehabilitated Prisoner in
America'?, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Feb. 2, 1992, at Ml; Tracy Thompson, Once "Unfit to
Live": Ex-Death-Row Inmates Winning Parole, ATLA1NTAJ. & CONST., March 12, 1987, at
Al; Bill Torpy, Special Update: Georgia s Death Row, Waiting to Die, ATANTAJ. & CONST.,
Nov. 17, 1996, at G8.
1 1
2 See Ronald Bailey, Rehabilitation on Death Row, in TiE DEATH PENAVLIYIN AMERCA
556 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1967).
In 1953, ajury convicted Crump of killing a security guard during a robbery, and
sentenced him to death. See People v. Crump, 125 N.E.2d 615 (111. 1955). Three of
four accomplices received a sentence of 199 years' imprisonment. The Illinois Su-
preme Court reversed Crump's conviction because the trial judge did not allow him
to cross-examine a prosecution witness, one of Crump's accomplices during the rob-
bery, as to his drug addiction. Crump was retried and again received a death sen-
tence. See People v. Crump, 147 N.E.2d 76 (ill. 1957) (per curiam). That conviction
and sentence were affirmed.
" Bailey, supra note 152, at 561.
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Paul Crump is completely rehabilitated. Should society demand
Paul's life at this point, it would be capital vengeance, not punishment.
If it were humanly possible, I would put Paul back on the street tomor-
row. I have no fear of any antisocial behavior on his part. I would stake
my life on it. And I would trust him with my life.'-'
On August 1, 1962, two days before the scheduled execution, Il-
linois Governor Otto Kerner, citing Crump's rehabilitation,
commuted Crump's death sentence to 199 years' imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.155
Caryl Whittier Chessman15 also seems to have undergone a
similar transformation. When he began serving his sentence,
Chessman's personality did not win him many fond acquain-
tances among the prison staff. According to one prison official,
Chessman was "the most arrogant and supercilious bastard in
the world, and probably one of the brightest. He was also in-
sidious and mean."5 7 When the prison staff denied Chessman's
request for special library privileges, he threatened legal action
and bodily harm to the prison librarian. The inmates held
Chessman in high regard, however. He was a jailhouse lawyer
without peer, although he violated the institution's rules in pro-
viding legal assistance to other prisoners. Chessman also taught
several subjects at the prison school. After Chessman secured
his first stay of execution, prison officials encouraged him to
write a book to deter him from further litigation and as a thera-
158peutic device. In 1954 Chessman produced Cell 2455: Death
Row,'59 an autobiography in which he maintained that he was
not the Red Light Bandit. In the book, Chessman claimed that
Id. at 562.
155 See Michael B. Lavinsky, Executive Clemency: Study of a Decisional Problem Arising in
the Terminal Stages of the CriminalProcess, 42 CHIc.-KENTL. REv. 13, 43-44 (1965).
56 See Part i1.-, supra.
157 CUMMINS, supra note 3, at 35.
.. Id. at 36-37.
15 See CARtYL CHESSMAN, CELL 2455: DEATH Row (1954). See CUMMINS, supra note 3,
at 39. The book was a critical success and a best seller. It even led one criminologist
to wonder whether experts should study Chessman instead of executing him. See
CUMMINS, supra note 3, at 39.
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his stay on death row had reformed him.' 6° By 1960 Chessman
was not claiming that he was innocent of the crimes; instead he
maintained that he would be more useful to society alive than
executed. 161
Like Chessman, Jose Jesus Ceja 62 made productive use of
this time while incarcerated. During his twenty-three years of
incarceration Ceja earned his high school equivalency diploma,
passed several college courses, worked in several prison jobs,
and had no major incidents in prison.6  At a clemency hearing,
the sentencing judge submitted an affidavit in which he stated
that if he "had realized that the criminal justice system would
make (Ceja) serve a life sentence under such harsh conditions
before putting him to death, I would have never entered the
order of death and, if empowered, would without hesitation,
change my ruling to life imprisonment."16
The passage of time and various life experiences affect an
individual's character. Though she did not spend an inordinate
time on death row, Karla Faye Tucker underwent a religious
4 CH-SSMAN, supra note 159, at 359. At least one former death row inmate has
questioned Chessman's sincerity and suggested that the book was a ploy to avoid the
death penalty. See CUMMINS, supra note 3, at 40.
Chessman used some proceeds from the sales to hire attorneys. The prison offi-
cials responded by eliminating some of Chessman's privileges, with the hope of mak-
ing it more difficult for him to write. Nonetheless, he eventually wrote three other
books while incarcerated: TRIAL BY ORDEAL (1955), THE FACE OFJUSTICE (1957), and
THE Km WAS A Kiui. (1960). Chessman achieved international fame from the publi-
cation of these books. One historian has noted that Chessman's supporters argued
that his life should be spared because he was a changed man, as demonstrated by his
intelligence. According to that historian,
It wasn't that he was not guilty of his crime, his public insisted; rather, the erudi-
tion, reason, and humane tone of his writing redeemed him. In an odd way, the pub-
lic's embrace of Chessman makes him seem rather remarkably like the accused in the
Middle Ages, who could avoid hanging by demonstrating that they could read.
See CUMMINs, supra note 3, at 52.
... CUMMINS, supra note 3, at 57.
162 See Part II.G., supra.
" Graham, supra note 54, at 17.
16 EJ. Montini, Kill Him Once or Kill Him Twice?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 1998, at
B1; Graham, supra note 54, at 17.
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conversion, but it was not sufficient to prevent her execution."
The years that Crump, Chessman, Ceja, and Tucker spent on
death row resulted in their becoming different persons from the
ones who committed the capital offenses that led to their con-
victions. Although rehabilitation is hardly the objective of capi-
tal punishment,16 the present death penalty system, which
permits execution after an inordinate delay, does not demon-
strably serve deterrence when a reformed death row prisoner is
executed. Moreover, to the extent retribution is achieved under
the present death penalty system, that system provides little re-
course for a reformed convicted murderer.
D. ADDRESSING INORDINATE DELAY CLAIMS
In light of all of the above, a capital defendant who has
spent an inordinate period on death row awaiting execution,
and now faces a serious execution date, should have the oppor-
tunity to establish that his or her pending execution violates the
Eighth Amendment. Such a claim is analogous to a claim based
on the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial or to the due
process right to a speedy criminal appeal.167 As established in
Barker v. Wingolr under the Sixth Amendment, in determining
whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated,
courts are to balance the length of delay, reason for the delay,
the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the. de-
fendant caused by the delay.'6 The federal courts have also at-
'" See Mike Ward & Rebecca Rodriguez, Tucker's Life Ends Amid Prayers for Forgive-
ness, Demands for Justice, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Feb. 4, 1998, at Al. For an ac-
count of Tucker's life and crime see BEvERLY LowRy, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A
MEMOIR (1992).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-86 (1976).
167 SeeArkin, supra note 57, at 456-61.
"8 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
'69See id. at 530. Today, after Barker and the enactment of the Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994), the federal courts routinely adjudicate speedy trial
claims. See, e.g., United States v. Giambrone, 920 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1990). Research
suggests that after the Speedy Trial Act became effective, the delay between the de-
fendant's indictment and prosecution has been modestly reduced. See George S.
Bridges, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal Criminal Litigation, 73J.
CRIM. L. & CRrIMNOLoGY 50, 53 (1982) (analyzing data from cases terminated from
1971 toJune 30, 1981).
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tempted to give content to the meaning of a state court defen-
dant's right to a speedy criminal appeal, although the four
Barker factors are not necessarily applicable.' 70 Nonetheless,
similar to the right to speedy criminal appeal, upon the showing
that the defendant has been under a death sentence for an in-
ordinate period, a capital defendant should be entitled to a new
sentencing hearing.171 This sentencing hearing would substitute
for the prior sentencing hearing that resulted in the death sen-
tence. At this substitute hearing, both the state and the defense
could argue over the propriety of imposing a death sentence,
based on the law as of the date of the substitute hearing.17 2 In
addition, the defendant should be able to present to the sen-
tencer post-conviction evidence, such as his adjustment to
prison, and to plead to the sentencer's mercy for a sentence less
than death. 73 In this regard, the delay in carrying out the exe-
cution could benefit the death row inmate. 74 This remedy
should provide a further incentive for the state to devise a capi-
tal punishment case processing system that provides both mean-
ingful and relatively punctual resolution of capital appeals.
'7 SeeArkin, supra note 57, at 461-73 (discussing cases from 1960 through 1990).
17, Id. at 486-90.
"n The defendant should be sentenced according to the law on the date of the
substitute hearing to ensure that the defendant is "deathworthy," see Aarons, supra
note 1, at 187 n.157, and to ensure that the prosecution has to meet the same stan-
dard in that defendant's case that it would have to meet in every other capital sen-
tencing proceeding conducted that day. In this regard, neither the defendant nor
the state has a sufficient interest in applying the capital sentencing laws, as of the date
of the initial sentencing hearing, to the facts that likely are developed at the substitute
sentencing hearing. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1993) (habeas peti-
tioner can rely on cases decided after conviction and sentence became final if they do
not change the law in favor of the criminal defendant). To allow the state to ignore
legal developments favorable to the defendant disregards the goals served by the writ.
See Liebman, supra note 63, at 595-613, 626-30.
173 See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 545-46 (1987) (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
174 When adjudicating inordinate delay claims, courts should probably consider
only minimally whether the prisoner suffered prejudice. More weight should be
given to the reason for the delay. Brian P. Brooks, Comment, A New Speedy Trial Stan-
dard for Barker v. Wingo: Reviving a Constitutional Remedy in an Age of Statutes, 61 U.
Cm. L. REV. 587, 608 (1994). Delay attributable to prosecutorial bad faith or miscon-
duct or a defective capital processing system should be held against the state. Id. at
n.104; Arkin, supra note 57, at 497.
19981
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V. OBJECTIONS TO RECOGNIZING INORDINATE DELAYAS A
SUBSTANTIVE LIMIT ON DEATH ELIGIBILTY
A few federal courts have heard death row inmates argue in
a successive habeas petition that their pending execution, which
would occur after the petitioner had spent years on death row,
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.17 5 None of these courts has ruled in favor
of a petitioner. 76 Moreover, the courts have generally refused to
consider the merits of the argument, 77 ruling that the prisoner
175 SeeAarons, supra note 1, at 205.
17
6 Two judges, both in dissent, have sketched some of the parameters of the claim.
See Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1372-78 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting);
McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1484-89 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J., dissenting). An-
other judge has expressed belief that the inordinate delay claim may have merit, but
questions where the line should be drawn for establishing inordinate delay. See State
v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1292 (Mont. 1996) (LeaphartJ., specially concurring).
'7 There are three exceptions: the Ninth Circuit in McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-68;
the Fifth Circuit in White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 275
(1996); and the Fourth Circuit in Turner v. Jabe 58 F. 3d 924(4th Cir. 1995). Techni-
cally, McKenzie and Turner, though they discuss the issue, do not adjudicate the merits
of the claim. In McKenzie, the Ninth Circuit gave "preliminary consideration" to the
issue to determine McKenzie's likelihood of success on the merits in determining
whether it should stay the execution. In Turner, the Fourth Circuit, because of the
non-retroactivity rules of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989), considered the
merits of the claim to determine whether not adjudicating the merits would result in
a miscarriage ofjustice. For a discussion of how Teague requires federal courts to as-
sess the merits of a claim, while asserting that they are not ruling on that claim, see
John Blume & William Pratt, UnderstandingTeague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Rxv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 325 (1990-1991); Mark Dirk Dubber, Prudence and Substance: How the Supreme
Court's New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mirrors and Affects Substantive Constitutional Law,
30 Am. CRIM. L. Rnv. 1 (1992).
The Fifth Circuit's discussion of the merits of a delay of 17 years in White is both
dicta and novel. The ruling is dicta because prior to reaching the merits, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that it was bound by circuit precedent to reject the claim under Teague,
but that even if that precedent did not exist it would rule that the claim was pre-
cluded by Teague because White did not fall under either of Teagues exceptions. Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the first exception to Teague did not apply because
announcing a rule in White's favor would neither place any primary conduct beyond
prohibition nor would it prohibit any category of punishment currently in use for
specific offenses. White's argument failed for two additional reasons. First, the de-
fendants in his proposed class did not have an innate characteristic, such as insanity
or mental retardation, which precluded imposition of the death penalty. Second, the
proposed class was not made up of individuals whose conduct was not eligible for
punishment by death at the time of sentencing.
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should have raised the claim earlier. This latter rationale seems
dubious, since the very basis of the inordinate delay claim is the
passage of time, and an earlier filed claim would be based on a
correspondingly weaker case.
More questionable, however, are later cases that rely on the
absence of precedent in any inmate's favor as the reason for re-
jecting the claim in the case before it.178 These later decisions
This is a novel construction of the exception. Under Teague, a new rule will be ret-
roactive if it places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." Teague, 489 U.S. at 307
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). The court in Penty
ruled that a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the state's power to
punish by death was analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the
state's power to punish at all. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989). "There-
fore, the first exception set forth in Teague should be understood to cover not only
rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules pro-
hibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense." Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. After Peny, it is not proper to ask only
whether the defendant could legally engage in certain conduct after the pronounce-
ment of the new rule, but one must also inquire into whether the new rule would
prohibit the state from executing a certain class of defendants. Recognition of the
inordinate delay claim would prevent the state from executing those defendants who
had been on death row for too long. Moreover, application of the first Teague excep-
tion does not require that that class of defendants possess anything other than the
characteristic that disqualifies them from being death eligible. An inordinate delay
between the death sentence and the scheduled execution would be sufficient; Teague
does not mandate that the defendant have possessed that characteristic before the
death sentence was imposed.
The Fifth Circuit, nonetheless, addressed the merits of White's claim. It noted
that there were substantial reasons for the delay, namely, the ability of capital defen-
dants to challenge their convictions in court to insure that the conviction was ob-
tained within the requirements of the law. White had not only invoked this review
process but he had benefited from having the courts review his arguments and de-
termine the validity of the conviction. Therefore, according to the court, he was in
no position to complain. Moreover, White had not made any effort to inform the
state courts that their delay was detrimental to him or to ask for an expedited review
of his case. White failed to assert that the delay was due to anything other than court
backlog, that the state acted with culpability in delaying the consideration of his peti-
tion, or that he had been subjected to the inevitable anxiety of waiting for an execu-
tion date. Thus, despite White's having raised the issue in his first federal habeas
petition, the court concluded that White was not entitled to relief.
'7' See, e.g., Turner, 58 F.3d at 932; Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 635, 637 (5th Cir.
1995); State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997);Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d
456, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 86 (1997).
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display the power of an idea to regenerate itself, without sub-
stantial questioning of the validity of the underlying idea.'7
Under the pre-AEDPA law, the federal courts considering
inordinate delay claims have relied on four general reasons in
concluding that inordinate claims are not cognizable: (1) the
inmate caused the delay; (2) it would be unfair to other death
row inmates to recognize the claim; (3) recognition of the claim
would disrupt the administration of capital punishment either
because it would create an incentive for states to rush execu-
tions or because habeas courts cannot fashion a proper remedy
for the asserted violation; and (4) the appropriate remedy for
inordinate delay is to apply for executive clemency. These
common objections do not truly fathom the actual operation of
the capital litigation process. This Part addresses these objec-
tions and posits that under both pre-AEDPA habeas law and the
AEDPA, the inordinate delay claim should be cognizable. Cases
are typically delayed for an inordinate period because the de-
fendant is marginally death eligible or because state officials,
who have substantial control over the processing of capital
cases, are indifferent to processing the cases with due dispatch.
Executive clemency, for various political and other reasons, is
not a meaningful option.
A. REASON FOR THE DELAY
Perhaps prompted by the distinctions made by Justice Stev-
ens in his memorandum regarding the denial of Lackey's cer-
tiorari petition,80  some courts have suggested that one
'79 Cf Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past.").
'Justice Stevens posited that some types of delays may be constitutionally differ-
ent from other types of delays. He suggested that the defendant might be responsible
for delays caused by abusing the judicial system, such as prison escapes or repetitive
frivolous filings. However, the delay occasioned by a legitimate exercise of a right to
review or arising from negligence or deliberate action by the state was to be consid-
ered in calculating the length of the delay. Justice Stevens' last characterization of
"the state" is a bit ambiguous. For instance, doeslit include the judiciary, which is an
appendage of the state; or does it include the legislature, which may not have pro-
vided adequate funding for defense services; or does it just include state officials who
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consideration for the granting of relief for inordinate delay is
whether the inmate caused the delay. At first blush this para-
digm appears attractive, but it does not fully capture the dynam-
ics of death penalty litigation.
In some sense all capital defendants delay their execution
when they present legal reasons why it should not occur. Yet, in
another sense it is the prosecutorial system itself that fosters the
delay in the execution of capital defendants, as approximately
half of the capital convictions or death sentences have been re-
versed."" A more thorough analysis of each case, focusing on
the case's actual litigation history, is likely to uncover the actual
reason for the delay. If that history shows that the capital de-
fendant or defense counsel has engaged in a systematic plan of
thwarting the enforcement of the sentence-such as through
piecemeal litigation of previously available claims-then the writ
of habeas corpus should not be available. If, however, the litiga-
tion record suggests that there has been no "sandbagging" and
that the defendant and defense counsel have been deliberate,
1812even cautious, in their responses to the litigation tactics of the
state, then the defendant should not be held solely responsible
for the time spent on death row.1
3
The courts that have reviewed inordinate delay claims seem
to suggest that capital defendants and their lawyers are engaged
have some formal role in prosecutorial decisions? See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045,
1047 (1995) (mem.) It may be that "the state" should be limited to individuals who
played a direct role in the prosecution of this particular defendant.
..1 See sources cited in note 63 supra. It is possible that there are many other death
sentences that never should have been imposed or should have been reversed on ap-
peal due to inadequacies in the judicial and political process. These cases typically
are not the concern of this Article.
"" The defense would evidence its apprehension and proper selectivity if "as to a
legal claim that was known or accessible to the petitioner and his counsel at the time
of the earlier petition, but had previously been rejected so routinely by the relevant
district and circuit courts (and, perhaps, the United States Supreme Court)" it would
have been both reasonable and diligent to omit the claim in the prior petition. 2
LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 130, § 28.3c, at 921-22.
"" An inmate could experience inordinate delay by the state's failure to seek an
execution date, notwithstanding the conclusion of all litigation over the conviction
and sentence. In tis circumstance it could be more readily declared that the state
no longer had an interest in going forward with the execution. The period in which
there was a lack of interest is attributable to the state, and the state should be es-
topped from later going forward with the execution.
1998]
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in a wholesale effort to prevent executions by raising almost any
184conceivable legal issue. Undoubtedly there are defense attor-
neys who take satisfaction in preventing any executions by clog-
ging up the judicial system.s However, one must keep in mind
that the most effective way that a capital defendant can prevent
his execution from taking place is not by asserting any reason
for a delay, but by raising at least colorable reasons for not carry-
ing out his execution." 6 Frivolous or insubstantial bases for re-
versal of capital sentences should not long delay an execution.
184 One of the most virulent statements to make it into a published opinion is in-
cluded in a separate concurrence in Turnen
It is a mockery of our system ofjustice, and an affront to law-abiding citizens who
are already disillusioned with that system, for a convicted murderer, who, through his
own interminable efforts of delay and systemic abuse has secured the almost-indefinite
postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the almost-indefinite postponement
renders his sentence unconstitutional. This is the crowning argument on behalf of
those who have politicized capital punishment even within the judiciary. With this ar-
gument, we have indeed entered the theater of the absurd, where politics disguised as
"intellectualism" occupies center stage, no argument is acknowledged to be frivolous,
and common sense and judgment play no role. And while this predictable plot unfolds
with our acquiescence, if not our participation, we lament the continuing decline in re-
spect for the courts and for the law.
Petitioner does not contest his guilt. He concedes, as he says he must, that his
death sentence was constitutionally permissible when imposed. He even concedes that,
until a month and a half ago, he himself did not wish to pursue further appeals. He has
brought four state habeas petitions and this is his fourth federal habeas petition. His
various claims have now been reviewed in at least twenty different federal and state pro-
ceedings. He has been accorded every possible opportunity to test the legitimacy of his
conviction and sentence. The delay of which he now complains is a direct consequence
of his own litigation strategy, coupled (ironically, although not surprisingly) with the
customary leniency allowed him by the courts to press his claims as effectively as possi-
ble.
This is not--or at least it should not be-a political game. The object is to apply
the law, not to defeat it through subterfuge. Petitioner's claim should be recognized for
the frivolous claim that it is, and his delay in raising it, for the manipulation that it is. As
long as the courts indulge such sophistic arguments, then such arguments will be made,
and the politicalization of capital punishment within the courts will continue.
Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) (citation omit-
ted). Among other items, Judge Luttig ignores that appointment to the bench has
more recently become "a political game." Bright & Keenan, supra note 94, at 784-91.
"5 David Margolick, Death Row Appeals Are Drawing Sharp Rebukes from Frustrated Fed-
eralJudges in the South, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 2, 1988, at B9 (suggesting some capital de-
fense attorneys take "quiet pride" in the "national logjam on death row").
For a brief portrait of some capital defense lawyers see David G. Stout, The Lawyers
of Death Row, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 14, 1988, at 46.
186 See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1992).
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Moreover, the courts can sanction attorneys for this conduct.87
Significantly, it is hard to find reported cases imposing such
sanctions.
One court has made a further distinction between the types
of delays in capital cases. 1m The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit noted that most of the fifteen-year delay
that capital defendant James P. Free, Jr. complained of in his
federal habeas petition occurred "in discretionary state and fed-
eral actions" filed by Free, but that in Lackey the delay was at-
tributable largely to mandatory direct appeals in state court,
with federal collateral review accounting for a modest part of
the delay. Based on this difference the Seventh Circuit refused
to issue a stay.
The distinction between direct and collateral review is illu-
sory because a direct criminal appeal is nondiscretionary on the
part of the state only if the state constitution or laws provide a
right to appeal. Arguably, a state could eliminate the right to
appeal a criminal conviction without violating the federal con-
stitution.'o More importantly, the distinction between time
'87 For instance, Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied to habeas petitions. See also FED. R.
Civ. PROC. 11 (providing for sanctions for frivolous pleadings).
U In 1979, an Illinois jury convicted James P. Free, Jr. of murder and attempted
rape of Bonnie Serpico and of the attempted murder and attempted rape of Lori
Rowe. Free killed Serpico after she tried to flee. As aggravating circumstances in
support of the death penalty, the jury found that Serpico's murder occurred during a
burglary and a rape. People v. Free, 447 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 1983). Three of the seven
justices voted to vacate the death sentence. They maintained that because Free was
not convicted of rape or burglary, the jury could not rely on the murder occurring
during the commission of those felony crimes as the basis for the death sentence. See
id. at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissenters also contended that the prosecution
submitted and relied on improper evidence at the sentencing hearing.
While incarcerated, Free continued to litigate the propriety of his conviction. At
one point, a federal district judge granted Free a writ of habeas corpus based on the
inadequacy of the jury instructions. See Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir.
1993) (brief recount of litigation history). That decision was reversed on appeal. Id.
at 706. Over 15 years later, in March 1995, on the eve of his pending execution, Free
moved the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to stay his execu-
tion, in light of Lackey. Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir.) (per curiam).
8 9 Free, 50 F.3d at 1362.
" See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987) (citing McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894)). But see Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitu-
tional Right to a Criminal Appeal 39 UCLA L. REv. 503 (1992) (suggesting that constitu-
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spent on state court review and time spent on federal habeas re-
view is normally not significant because in most capital cases the
delay between the imposition of a death sentence and the exe-
cution of a capital defendant is largely attributable to the state
court system.19'
The individual states are largely responsible for the admini-
stration of capital punishment. According to a 1990 American
Bar Association Report:
The sources of delay are numerous. They include, for example: de-
lays in appointing counsel; delays from less than adequate competence
of counsel; delays in processing state transcripts and records; delays from
reviewing records that are ordinarily longer than in noncapital cases; de-
lays from state policies and procedures; delays from uncertainty concern-
ing the substantive criminal law and eighth amendment law; delays from
the application of, and uncertainty about the interpretation of, threshold
inquiries for federal habeas corpus review; delays from discovery of new
facts; delays from developments in the law; and delays from the under-
standable inclination of both litigants and their attorneys to postpone
the ultimate sanction. In short, much of the delay in the carrying out of
the death sentences occurs at the state level; other aspects of the "delay"
are both indispensable and desirable to allow for solemn and studied
scrutiny.19
In short, when there has been an inordinate delay between the
imposition of the sentence and the pending execution, the state
is usually directly responsible for a great part of the delay.
The cases discussed in Part II all involved delay attributable
to the state that was neither indispensable nor desirable. While
courts should generally carefully consider all the defendant's
claims, a thorough determination by the courts that a claim
lacks merit usually means that the conviction or sentence can-
not be reversed later based on that claim.
tional due process developments since McKane support a right to appeal criminal
conviction).
191 See Robbins, supra note 95, at 138. Even when a federal court issues a writ of ha-
beas corpus the inmate ordinarily is not released immediately. Rather, the state is in-
structed to either perform certain judicial functions, such as a retrial or a new
hearing within a specific period of time or to release the prisoner. Consequently,
once again the processing of the case is in the hands of state officials.
2 Id. at 138-39.
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Unfortunately some courts do not address thoroughly the
claims raised by capital defendants, thus prompting these de-
fendants to try to litigate these same issues years later. For in-
stance, Chessman's strongest argument for reversing his death
sentence was the absence of an adequate, contemporaneous
trial transcript. This error coupled with an ill-designed state
court process only exacerbated the perception that due process
was violated. Noncapital defendants often have a right to ap-
peal to an intermediate appellate court with discretionary re-
view of their conviction in a higher court. Chessman, however,
was only able to have his case reviewed by the seven justices on
the California Supreme Court on direct appeal. Eliminating the
intermediate appellate court from reviewing his conviction and
sentence may have prolonged his case. There is no guarantee
that the intermediate appellate court would have ruled differ-
ently from the California Supreme Court, but the availability of
that forum would have allowed the judges on the state supreme
court to consider the views of other appellate judges in that
case. When the United States Supreme Court reviewed his case
eleven years later, it said that the manner of reconstructing the
transcript did not comport with due process as it existed at the
time of his trial.193 Thus, after more than a decade of litigation,
only the United States Supreme Court enforced established
federal law-partly because the California Supreme Court did
not give full effect to that law when it affirmed Chessman's con-
viction. In this sense, the conduct of some state officials, includ-
ing the trial and appellate prosecutors, contributed to
Chessman's prolonged stay on death row.
As in Chessman, Townsend's prosecution was flawed. The
conviction rested on an involuntary confession. At the prosecu-
tion's request, the state court admitted the confession, even
though the United States Supreme Court had previously disap-
proved of interrogation techniques that brought about involun-
tary confessions."' In Turner, the Court changed the law by
permitting the voir dire of prospective jurors on their racial atti-
C' hessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 162 (1957).
"' The Court itself noted that the medical community was divided on the validity
of "truth serums." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308-09 & n.5 (1963).
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tudes. In light of this change, Turner could have expected to
be on death row for an extended period, as subsequent courts
had these newly enunciated issues to address.
The delay resulting in McKenzie's two decades on death row
was of a different sort; it involved state courts disregarding the
dictates of emerging federal law. McKenzie's delay was partly at-
tributable to state court judges who were resistant-if not hos-
tile-to applying the developing law on jury instructions, which
was favorable to criminal defendants. And it was partly due to a
seemingly determined effort by the trial judge and the prosecu-
tor to impose the death sentence. After the United States Su-
preme Court remanded the case, the Montana Supreme Court
first ruled that there was no error. After a second remand, it
concluded that there was error, but it was harmless. Only years
later, during federal post-conviction proceedings, were ex parte
communications between the judge and prosecutor discovered.
If the Montana Supreme Court had reversed the conviction or
remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing in either of its
first two considerations of the case because of the newly an-
nounced federal rulings, a subsequent prosecution of McKenzie
should have resulted in another death sentence-were the evi-
dence against McKenzie truly as convincing as the state's high
court had ruled. Appeals from that second conviction and sen-
tence should have been largely error free and would have
eliminated McKenzie's most promising legal argument. In-
stead, McKenzie's prosecution contained errors, the review of
which prolonged judicial review of the case.
Lackey suggests a third type of delay: a change in capital sen-
tencing law that is favorable to the defendant. The 1989 Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of Lackey's conviction
and sentence rested on a disputed interpretation of the law.
The court majority rationalized its decision as within the bounds
of the law. The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, could just
as easily have reversed Lackey's conviction, if its focus was on
applying established law to the proceedings. Peny, which essen-
tially agreed with Lackey's argument,95 underscored that the
.95Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320-28 (1989).
[Vol. 89
DELA YiN CAPITAL CASES
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision was not a foregone conclu-
sion. Had the Court of Criminal Appeals followed the analysis
in Penry, Lackey's death sentence would have been vacated be-
cause the jury had not been adequately instructed on its consid-
eration and use of Lackey's mitigating evidence. Proper use of
that evidence could have led the jury to decline to impose a
death sentence.
Richmond's case involves a similar application of unsettled
law in a capital case, in a jurisdiction with truncated direct ap-
pellate review of the trial process. In his direct appeal the state
courts determined that its laws were unconstitutional, and in a
subsequent appeal of another death sentence, the Arizona Su-
preme Court could not agree which aggravating circumstances
supported the death sentence. In light of this, it is not surpris-
ing that Richmond was able to raise nonfrivolous arguments
challenging his conviction and sentence for more than twenty
years.
The capital nature of each of these cases undoubtedly af-
fected judicial review and the litigation tactics of both the
prosecution and defense. 19 If these cases had not involved the
death penalty, it is likely that the state, faced with a remand
from the United States Supreme Court (as in Chessman, McKen-
zie and Turner) or an extension of the law in the defendant's fa-
vor (as in Lackey, Richmond and Turner) would have reached a
plea bargain. Thus, the sentence imposed affected the han-
dling of the cases, and may have distorted both the state's and
the defendant's decisions to continue litigating each case. More
generally, these cases suggest the true nature of inordinate delay
cases: all cases involved a legal ruling favorable to the defendant
at some point in the litigation. 7 This turn of events under-
mined arguments by the prosecution that prior case law had al-
ready resolved disputed legal issues in the state's favor. In
actuality, a definitive ruling on the issue did not exist, and the
"6 See Samuel 1- Gross, The Romance of Revenge: Capital Punishment in America, 13
STUD. L. POL. & Soc'y 71 (1993).
197 In Lackey, McKenzie and Townsend an intervening United States Supreme Court
case dictated the change, and in Chessman and Turner the Court itself granted certio-
rari and ruled in the capital defendant's favor.
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lack of such a ruling became apparent while the case was under
appellate court review. Consequently it may be doubtful that,
when the prosecution decided to seek the death penalty based
on the legally provable facts known to the prosecutor when the
charges were filed, each defendant was within the "core" class of
death eligible defendants. 8
Today the parameters of death eligibility have been more
narrowly defined than at the time of Chessman and Townsend.
Now, a death sentence can be imposed on a defendant only if it
accords with the evolving standards of decency as measured by
history, judicial precedent, statutes, and jury verdicts in capital
cases; and the execution must achieve deterrence or retribu-
tion.9 It is likely that the belief that the defendant did not fit
within the established category of capital defendants provided
each of the defendants discussed in Part HI, and their attorneys,
with the incentive to continue litigating their case. Further-
more, some judges on the courts that reviewed these cases ex-
pressed such reservations, which, in turn, may have accounted
for the defendants' continued litigiousness and eventual lengthy
stays on death row.
19 Chessman, McKenzie and Ceja arguably were substantively defective. Chessman
did not kill anyone; he was convicted of kidnapping under California's "Little Lind-
bergh Law," but was sentenced to death. The California State Supreme Court later
declared that law unconstitutional. In re Matson, 109 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1973). Subse-
quent developments under the Eighth Amendment suggest that kidnappers who did
not kill their victims are not deserving of death. Governor Pat Brown has described
the "Little Lindbergh Law," which was the basis for Chessman's death sentences, as a
"legal swamp." BROWN & ADLER, supra note 3 at 94; see also People v. Wein, 326 P.2d
457, 475-84 (Cal. 1958) (Carter, J., dissenting) (discussing history and construction of
kidnapping statute and its possible constitutional infirmities).
As to McKenzie, there was never a judicial determination that McKenzie had the
appropriate mens rea for the murder for which he was executed. In Ceja's case, Eloy
Ysasia, the primary homicide investigator, stated that he thought Ceja's crime would
be prosecuted as second degree murder, a noncapital crime. Graham, supra note 54,
at 15.
Townsend and Turner had procedural defects. At the time of Townsend's prosecu-
tion in 1955, the United States Supreme Court had disapproved of coercive and sug-
gestive identification and interrogation techniques similar to those employed against
Townsend. The defect in Turner-prohibiting an inquiry into race-was arguably
cured by granting him a new sentencing hearing.
199 See Aarons, supra note 1, at 157-60.
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In short, if an inmate has been on death row for an inordi-
nate length of time that delay may suggest that the initial deci-
sion to prosecute the defendant as a capital offender was
questionable. The delay in carrying out the death penalty also
may reflect a consensus by several actors in the capital litigation
process-such as subsequent prosecutors, juries, state and fed-
eral judges, and governors-that the defendant is not truly de-
serving of death. Ultimately, in initiating (and continuing) the
prosecution of these cases, the trial prosecutor's office risked
that others in the capital processing system might be troubled
by extending the law to apply to these defendants. One could
argue that a death row prisoner invariably benefits from the in-
ordinate delay in carrying out a death sentence. This ignores
the psychological impact associated with death row detention,
which is probably exacerbated by the elusive hope of eventual
release.
B. UNFAIRNEsS TO OTHER CAPITAL INMATES
In Turner, the Fourth Circuit suggested that unfairness to
other death row inmates is a reason for not recognizing inordi-
nate delay as a substantive violation of the Eighth Amendment.
According to that court, "If petitioners A and B were sentenced
to death on the same date but A's collateral review happened to
end one year earlier than B's, A could be put to death while B
would be spared."2°° This is an insufficient reason to refuse to
recognize the claim on habeas review.
Tu er is objecting to the seemingly arbitrary line between
inordinate and ordinary delay in capital cases. Throughout the
law, however, such demarcations exist. These lines mark the
difference between, for instance, what facts state a cause of ac-
tion or by when a party has to file his legal claim. The criminal
law is not exempt from this line-drawing. Consider the com-
mon-law rule that the death of the victim must occur within a
year and a day of the defendant's conduct.01 This limitation es-
sentially declared a temporal point at which a person was no
'Turner v.Jabe, 58 F.d 924, 931 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995).




longer legally accountable for the death of another human be-
ing. Suppose that on the same day, A assaulted C, intending to
kill her, and B assaulted D, intending to kill him. C dies within
a year and a day from injuries suffered in the assault, but D dies
of the injuries he received a year and two days after the assault.
Under the common law, the state may prosecute A for homicide
while B would face only attempted homicide charges. Although
there is today generally no statute of limitation within which a
state has to prosecute a homicide, having inordinate delay as a
cognizable claim in death penalty litigation would not under-
mine that rule. Only after the inmate receives a death sentence
is the seed of an inordinate delay claim planted; other legal
principles apply to the pre-conviction delay, which may fore-
close a capital prosecution."2
Moreover, Turner's hypothetical suggests that a capital de-
fendant who delayed his execution for several years could pre-
vent an execution. First, if the prisoner succeeds in doing so,
the inmate's success does not render another defendant's fail-
ure to avoid death arbitrary.03 Significantly, making inordinate
delay claims cognizable will not necessarily preclude the state
from executing an inmate who has been on death row for a
lengthy period. As discussed above,2°4 when an inmate estab-
lishes that there has been an inordinate delay between the pro-
nouncement of death sentence and his scheduled execution, a
court should order a new sentencing hearing. At this subse-
quent hearing, the state could still seek a death sentence.
Recognizing inordinate delay claims will not reward inmates
for being dilatory or litigious. If the prosecution has been dili-
gent in prosecuting the capital case, the issue of inordinate de-
lay usually will not arise. It is when the case is on the margins of
' See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delay of eight and one-
half years between indictment and prosecution may violate sixth amendment right to
speedy trial); Barker v. Wingo, 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971), affid, 407 U.S. 514
(1972) (outlining criteria for determining whether right to speedy trial violated).
203 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 307 n.28 (1987) (death penalty not uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary or violative of equal protection principles if some death eligible
defendants either do not receive the sanction or if those sentenced to death are not
executed); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (same).
See Part IV.D. supra.
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death eligibility (coupled with an intervening change in law in
the defendant's favor), and the state has been lax in moving the
case through the litigation process, that the question of inordi-
nate delay arises. In short, a capital case may be delayed for an
inordinate length of time not simply because the inmate or his
or her attorney is litigious, but because of the strength of the
claims asserted, which, in turn, may raise the question of
whether the defendant deserves death. More important than
the litigiousness of the parties is that courts exist to scrutinize
carefully convictions and death sentences. If, because of that
scrutiny, a court invalidates a conviction or death sentence, it
may be partly attributable to good lawyering by the defense, but
it may also be because of inadequate legal or factual support for
the conviction or sentence. °5
C. DISRUPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Another reason proffered against recognizing inordinate
delay claims is that such a ruling would create a disincentive for
courts to grant stays of execution. Conceivably, this concern
would be more pronounced as the length of the delay ap-
proached the presumptive period for establishing a prima facie
claim of inordinate delay. Under the present law, in deciding
whether to grant a stay of execution a federal court can consider
the last-minute nature of the request.2°6 Thus, a "preliminary
inquiry" into the actual causes of the delay should suggest
whether granting a stay is appropriate.0 7 This is appropriate be-
cause, in considering whether to grant a stay, courts generally
It is generally believed that in some circumstances under the present capital liti-
gation process, death row inmates are often represented by attorneys who are hair-
breadths away from rendering ineffective assistance of counsel. See generally Stephen
B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Cime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE LJ. 1835 (1994); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
"Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWAL. REv. 433 (1993).
"6Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam).
"7 See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1464-66 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Nicole Veil-
leux, Note, Staying Death Penalty Executions: An Empirical Analysis of Changing Judicial
Attitudes, 84 GEo. LJ. 2543 (1996) (surveying federal courts' approach to granting
stays in capital cases).
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consider the movant's likelihood of success on the merits.208
Though a habeas court can consider the timing of the filing
when deciding whether to stay an execution, that issue is not de-
terminative.2 0 Due to the delay between the pronouncement of
the death sentence and the pending execution, and the great
likelihood that the state retained substantial control of the case,
the courts should require the state to prove why its need for car-
rying out the execution now should prevail.21°
One habeas federal court expressed concern about whether
there is an appropriate remedy for an inordinate delay claim.
21'
In capital cases, when there is a constitutionally reversible error
in the sentencing hearing, federal courts typically remand the
case to state court, with a conditional order directing the state
either to resentence the defendant in a constitutionally valid
proceeding or to vacate the death sentence and impose a per-
21missible lesser sentence. This is the appropriate remedy in
inordinate delay cases, too. It seems logical to treat successful
inordinate delay claimants like capital defendants who success-
fully establish that they have become insane while awaiting exe-
cution. In insanity cases, the enforcement of the death
sentence is suspended until the inmate regains his sanity.
21
3 Ar-
'0 See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (stay pending appeal in federal
habeas case).
219 See Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654; see generally Williams v. Chrans, 50 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir.
1995) (per curiam).
2" SeeJohn T. Noonan, Should State Executions Run on Schedule?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1992, at A17.
2" See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
212 See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 52 (1992) (remand to district court with
instructions to grant habeas petition unless state within a reasonable time corrects
constitutional error in death sentence or imposes lesser sentence); Parker v. Dugger,
498 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1991) (remand to district court with instructions to order state
to initiate appropriate state court proceedings so death sentence may be reconsid-
ered); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 392 (1986) (remand to district court with in-
structions to grant habeas petition vacating death sentence and leaving choice to state
courts of either imposing sentence of life imprisonment or within reasonable time
obtaining determination of constitutionally required factual predicate).
212 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 n.5 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[I]f
petitioner is cured of his disease, the State is free to execute him."); Kristen Wenstrup
Crosby, Comment, State v. Perry: Louisiana's Cure-to-Kill Scheme Forces Death Row Inmates
to Choose Between a Life Sentence of Untreated Insanity and Execution, 77 MINN. L. REV.
1193, 1200 n.36 (1993) (citing statutes).
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guably, the state can medicate the defendant so the status of in-
sanity may be merely temporary.14 Similarly to insane capital
defendants, inordinate delay claimants are challenging a legal
classification into which they entered after the commission of
the capital offense. The state should prove that the defendant is
no longer within that class of defendants before it executes
him. 5 It is true that the state cannot turn back the hands of
time for thoge inmates who have been under a death sentence
for an inordinate length of time. But the state should provide a
constitutionally valid sentencing hearing after the inmate has
experienced inordinate delay. The main issue at this later sen-
tencing hearing would be whether the death penalty is the ap-
propriate punishment for this defendant at this time,
notwithstanding the passage of time that he had already spent
on death row.
Double jeopardy principles do not preclude the prosecution
from seeking a death sentence in this subsequent sentencing
hearing.1 6 The Court ruled in Bullington v. Missouri2 7 and Ai-
zona v. Rums Y2  that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the state
from seeking a death sentence at any resentencing hearing if a
death sentence was not imposed upon the initial conviction. In
the Court's view, by declining to sentence the defendant to
death, the sentencer had effectively "acquitted" the defendant
of the death penalty. In contrast, a successful inordinate delay
claimant cannot assert that the jury acquitted him of the death
sentence in the first sentencing proceeding; his likely argument
would have been that the sentencer relied on incomplete in-
formation when imposing the death sentence. Even if the de-
". The Court has not ruled on whether involuntarily medicating a capital defen-
dant, to render the inmate competent to be executed, violates due process. See Perry
v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (remand to state court in light of Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990), which held that forcibly treating inmate with anti-
psychotic drugs does not violate substantive due process if prisoner is dangerous and
treatment is in prisoner's medical interest).
2" See supra note 173.
"' See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987) (remanding for sentencing
hearing that is constitutionally valid); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(same).
217 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981).
2"s 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
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fendant's conduct on death row undermined the sole aggravat-
ing circumstance, the state can again seek to impose the death
penalty.
219
Another facet of supposed disruption of the capital pun-
ishment system arises out of institutional roles. Since the mid-
1980s, concerns about finality of state court convictions, federal-
ism, preserving judicial resources, and fairness have been the os-
tensible animating concerns of the Supreme Court in habeas220
cases.0 These interrelated objectives should not prevent con-
sideration of an inordinate delay claim. In the death penalty
context, it seems that the two paramount concerns are finality
and federalism. The finality doctrine is premised on the notion
that the capital trial is such a momentous event that defendants
should raise and litigate all pertinent issues relating to the con-
viction and sentence in that proceeding. Direct appeals are the
state-provided mechanisms for correcting most trial errors. To-
ward this end, the Court has generally precluded federal habeas
petitioners from litigating federal issues raised or that should
have been raised in the state courts. Barring criminal defen-
dants from raising these claims ensures that criminal judgments
are more likely to be truly final. Similarly, federalism concerns
arise from the perceived tension in having federal courts review
federal constitutional questions after the state processes have
not only provided a forum for the resolution of those questions,
but have invariably ruled against the petitioner. Federalism and
comity are both given their full measure of respect if a state offi-
cial's treatment of federal constitutional issues is accorded re-
spect equal to a federal official's resolution of these issues.221 In
turn, preservation of judicial resources occurs if only rarely are
federal courts permitted to consider issues that should have
been litigated at trial.
,9 Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986) (second death sentence did not violate
Double Jeopardy Clause because appellate court when vacating first death sentence
found insufficient evidence to support aggravating circumstance, but did not find
evidence insufficient to support death penalty).
" See Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 GAL. L.
REv. 485, 487-92 (1995).
2, Id. at 535-41.
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If the state does not provide a forum in which a capital de-
fendant can meaningfully litigate his or her inordinate delay
claim, then there is no denigration of the principles of finality,
federalism, and comity when a federal court reviews the claim.
Paul Bator, whose work provides the philosophical basis for the
Court's recent reinterpretation of the writ of habeas corpus,
recognized this principle. Bator acknowledged that a federal
forum should be available if the "states frequently fail[ed] to
provide a fair and rational setting for the litigation of claims of
federal constitutional right[s] .,225 He took issue with the propo-
sition that a federal forum should be available when there was
"no reasoned basis to suspect failure to provide a rational trial
of the federal question, before an unbiased tribunal and
through fair procedures. 224 Considering the continued number
of errors that federal courts uncover in capital cases and the in-
creased public criticism of state court decisions in capital cases,
however, a serious question now exists whether state courts are
forums in which a capital defendant's rights may receive a fair
adjudication.s In any event, it would take a fair amount of te-
merity for a state, which has violated the established rights of a
capital defendant in securing a death sentence and which has
confined that defendant on death row for more than twice as
long as the national average, to claim that its interest in a final
2 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1986). See also Stewart v. Martinez-
Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1622 (1998) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (3) restriction
on second or successive habeas petitions as not precluding consideration of a claim
that ripens after adjudication of first habeas petition). I read judge Fletcher's dissent
in Ceja as essentially relying on this principle because she intimates that a challenge to
a long stay on death row ("long stay") might be raised sooner in the post-conviction
process, but that a challenge asserting that a long-delayed execution ("long-delayed")
does not serve a valid penological purpose can be adjudicated in the federal courts
on the eve of execution. See Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1376-78 (9th Cir.
1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Her distinction has greater force if "long stay" claims
can be raised in some state forum, but there is no similar forum in which to raise a
"long-delayed" claim.
' See Bator, supra note 149, at 521-22. But see Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Ha-
beas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982) (arguing that historical,
institutional and jurisprudential values allow for relitigation of claims on habeas re-
view).
"'Bator, supra note 149, at 522.
"'See Thomas E. Plank, The Essential Elements ofJudicial Independence and the Experi-
ence ofPre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARYBILL oF RTS.J. 1, 10-13, 23-28 (1996).
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criminal judgment and the principles of federalism absolutely
precludes consideration of the merits of the inordinate delay
claim.
226
In sum, the most frequently proffered reasons for not con-
sidering the merits of inordinate delay claims are not valid when
considered in light of the actual operation of the capital litiga-
tion process.
D. AVAnABIu= OF CLEMENCY
One might argue that if an inmate has been on death row
for an inordinate length of time, and during that time has had a
marked change in character, that inmate is a prime candidate
for executive clemency. Generally, under the clemency power,
the governor or an institution acting in an executive capacity,
such as a parole board or pardon board, has the authority to is-
sue pardons, invalidate convictions, and commute or reduce
sentences. In light of executive clemency, the argument goes, it
is preferable to have death row inmates use the clemency power
because it would leave the decision of sparing the defendant's
life to the judgment of state political officials and not detract
Notwithstanding debates on the availability of habeas corpus, it is worth keeping
in mind that it takes approximately five years from the date of the conviction to the
filing of a federal habeas petition. See Roger A. Hanson & Henry W. IL Daley, How
Federal Courts Handle Habeas Corpus Petitions: Is the Process Effective?, 34 JUDGES' J., Fall
1995, at 4,6. It is even possible that finality concerns, which purportedly motivated
the Court's reconstruction of the federal writ of habeas corpus, actually foster delay
and undermine finality, particularly in capital cases. Rather than addressing seem-
ingly defaulted claims on the merits the first time they are raised, present habeas doc-
trine seems to foster delay by telling habeas petitioners, "Not now," when it could just
as well answer the question on the merits. One commentator has surveyed these
changes in habeas law and concluded that they are a failure, in part because they re-
sult in the Court's preoccupation with procedural rather than substantive issues. See
Friedman, supra note 220, at 527, 533-34.
When a federal district court is able to reach the merits of the claims, it takes on
average 494 days (about 16 months) to resolve a death penalty habeas petition, but
this time is more a measure of case complexity-that is, the number of issues,
whether the petition is decided on the merits, appointment of counsel, and the hold-
ing of an evidentiary hearing-than the type of sentence. On average, in death pen-
alty cases, the federal district courts take less than a year and a half to decide the case.
Hanson & Daley, supra, at 10-11 & tbl.9.
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from the important work of the federal courts.2 Further,
commentators have suggested that executive clemency should
be reserved for rehabilitated offenders78 or when there have
been other changes in the prisoner's character or condition.2-
While the clemency power exists in theory, the sharp de-
cline of its use in capital cases suggests that clemency is not a
meaningful option for capital defendants. Professors Michael
Radelet and Barbara Zsembik have documented seventy cases
since 1972 in which capital defendants had their death sen-
tences commuted through executive clemency. ° In only one of
those cases was rehabilitation the most important reason for
commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment.21
227 Over the years, such sentiments have been proffered by members of the Court
in reasoning why the writ of habeas corpus should not issue in a particular capital
case. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411 (1993) (In rejecting petitioner's
claim based on actual innocence of the capital crime, the Court noted, "petitioner
may file a request for executive clemency."); id, at 428 (Scalia,J., concurring) ("[I]t is
improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opinion requires
would fail to produce an executive pardon."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
876 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting governor could use pardon power if citi-
zens of Oklahoma thought it improper to execute juvenile); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 472-76 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting proper course for relief from
conviction from which no appeal was taken was not by expanding scope of review in
habeas corpus, but through the governor's exercise of clemency).
2 See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Dedine ofExecutive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 261 (1990-1991).
2'9 See Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Staples, The Role of Executive Clemency in Modem Death
Penalty Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 227, 236-37 (1993). Neither physical nor mental
disability has proven to be a universally sufficient ground for granting executive
clemency. For example, despite receiving over 1800 letters supporting clemency and
47 against, in 1993, Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder declined to grant clemency
to Charles Sylvester Stamper to avert Stamper's execution. Stamper, a multiple mur-
derer, was confined to a wheelchair after he was involved in a prison fight in 1988.
Bill Miller, The Execution of a Disabled Killer Rekindles the Debate on Capital Punishment,
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1993, at Z10.
23 See Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman
Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L REv. 289, 290-92 (1993).
" The inmate was William Neal Moore. In 1974, Moore pleaded guilty to armed
robbery and murder. See Moore v. State, 213 S.E.2d 829, 830 (Ga. 1975). The day be-
fore his execution, in 1990, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles commuted his
sentence. Among the factors the Board cited were Moore's exemplary prison record,
remorse for the crime, his religious conversion, and requests for clemency by the vic-
tim's mother, Reverend Jesse Jackson, and Mother Teresa. See Radelet & Zsembik,
supra note 230, at 302, 313.
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In addition, rehabilitation was reportedly a factor in Montana Governor Schwin-
den's 1988 commutation of David Cameron Keith's death sentence and Virginia
Governor Allen's 1997 commutation of William Allen Sanders' death sentence. See
Lethal Injustice, supra note 60, at 18 & n.15; Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 230, at
302, 311.
The prospects for clemency in capital cases were not always so bleak. It seems that
nearly one-fourth of the defendants sentenced to death in the early 1940s had their
sentences commuted. See Bedau, supra note 228, at 262. The available data suggest
that in the 1960s, commutations occurred once for every 6.3 capital sentences. See id.
at 264. Since then, however, commutations of death sentences have become increas-
ingly rare. From 1979 to 1988, out of the 2,535 death sentences imposed, there were
63 commutations, which yields a ratio of one commutation for every 40.2 death sen-
tences. See id. Hugo Bedau has offered some explanations for this apparent decline.
See id at 264-70. In the late 1960s, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was having mod-
erate success in its litigation campaign to have the death penalty declared unconstitu-
tional. It is likely that there were few clemency petitions filed because few inmates
were subject to a serious risk of being executed. For the commutations granted in the
mid-1960s through 1976, governors could assure those seeking an explanation for
their actions that in commuting the death sentence, the governor was conscientiously
following the emerging consensus on the inappropriateness of capital punishment.
After 1976, with the widespread public support for the death penalty, and the Court's
ruling that capital punishment was an appropriate sanction for some murders, under
guided discretion statutes, governors became more reluctant to exercise clemency.
Professor Bedau has postulated that because of the guidelines approved in the 1976
cases, the public may believe that the judicial process ensures that only the most de-
serving criminals receive death sentences and that clemency is no longer necessary.
See id. at 268-69. In the past, governors sometimes granted pardons when there had
been some judicial disapproval of how the state obtained the conviction. Id. at 260.
Today, even when there are questions regarding the prosecution's tactics, clemency is
largely unavailable. Warren McCleskey's case is perhaps a good example of this phe-
nomenon. Over the course of his many appeals several judges concluded that his
constitutional rights had been violated. Nonetheless, the Georgia Board of Pardons
and Parole, under apparent pressure from the state Attorney General, declined to
commute his death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment. Mark Curriden, Exe-
cution of McCleskey Spurs Outrage: 2 Trips to Chair, Hours of Delay Precede Death of Officer's
Killer, Inmate Asks Vi ctim's Family to Forgive Him, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Sept. 25, 1991, at
Al:
Another by-product of the apparent popularity of capital punishment is that
commutation of a death sentence is now considered politically infeasible, and a pub-
lic official's "demonstrated enthusiasm for executions will ensure reelection or elec-
tion to a higher office." Neal Walker, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty, 22 AM. J.
CalM. L. 266, 270 (1994). Bill Clinton is a good example of this curiosity. In 1992,
while campaigning for the presidency, out of an apparent concern for being labeled
"soft on crime" and during the height of allegations of an extra-marital affair with
Gennifer Flowers, Clinton refused to commute the death sentence of Ricky Ray Rec-
tor. Rector was mentally impaired and apparently did not realize that he was to about
to be executed. On the way to the death chamber he reportedly claimed that he in-
tended to vote for Clinton for president. See Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, THE
NEwYoRKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105. At the first presidential debate in his successful re-
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Capital defendants who have been on death row for an in-
ordinate length of time are not immune from the political as-
pects of the clemency decision. 2 Although Chessman was a
capital inmate whom one would have thought was a prime can-
didate for clemency, an option alluded to in the denial of his
last habeas petition,33 that choice was politically unpalatable to
Governor Edmund Brown, and perhaps was also legally unavail-
able.2 More recent cases, such as Lackey, McKenzie and Turner,
show that an inmate's inordinate stay on death row is not given
significant weight in executive clemency decisions. In short,
even for those capital defendants who have been on death row
for an inordinate period and have an exemplary prison record
there is no guarantee that their claims will receive full consid-
eration at a clemency proceeding.2ss It is even less likely that the
clemency outcome will be favorable toward the inmate. To
think otherwise is like believing in UFOs and Bigfoot, that is, a
"faith in fantasy."23
6
election campaign in 1996, whenever summarizing his accomplishments Clinton
mentioned on four occasions that he had signed legislation authorizing the death
penalty. See Mark Kuhn ed., Transcript from the Commission on Presidential Debates (on
file with author).
Continued service on the pardon board might be jeopardized by voting to grant
clemency. See McCleskey v. Bowers, 501 U.S. 1281, 1282 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing from denial of stay of execution) (asserting Attorney General "threatened to 'wage
a full scale campaign to overhaul the pardons and paroles board'" if it granted death
row inmate relief); VictoriaJ. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on
Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311, 350 (1996)
(former member of Utah Board of Pardons describing safety precautions taken when
considering petition of notorious capital defendant).
"2 It is noteworthy that Governor Kerner commuted Crump's death sentence in
1965, during a different phase of the history of capital punishment.
" Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 610 n.1 (9th Cir. 1960) (quoting district
judge).
24 Brown believed that he could only grant a brief reprieve and that a majority of
the California Supreme Court had to agree with any clemency decision. See BROWN &
ADLER, supra note 3, at 48-50. That court had informally voted four to three against
clemency. Id. at 34.
"' See, e.g., Ex parte Tucker, 1998 WL 28104 (Tex. Crim. App. Writ No. 21159-03
Jan. 28, 1998) (Overstreet, J., concurring) ("I would say that clemency law in Texas is a
legal fiction at best.")
2 Palacios, supra note 231, at 348.
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VI. AVOIDING INORDINATE DELAY
Alex Kozinski and Sean Gallagher have explored the issue
of delay in executions. According to them, it typically takes
two years from the capital crime until imposition of the death
sentence.us Once the post-conviction proceedings begin, it can
take from seven to. ten years before the case comes to some
semblance of a conclusion.209 Kozinski and Gallagher also note
that capital cases impose burdens on the judicial system. 240 They
suggest that there may be two apparent solutions: either whole-
sale judicial repudiation of Eighth Amendment case law or res-
ervation of the death penalty for only the most depraved killers.
They acknowledge that discarding Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence is an unlikely prospect. Thus, the only real option is
to narrow the class of defendants prosecuted for capital of-
fenses. Kozinski and Gallagher apparently rely on the good
faith of prosecutors to bring about this change. Under such a
prosecution policy, the sentencer would consider imposing the
death penalty only in those cases in which it is most likely that
the execution would occur. Ideally, only the worst of the worst
would suffer the death penalty, and their proposal would re-
move the issue of capital punishment from the courts and place
it back into the more political branches of government.241 Capi-
' SeeAlex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Utimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 1 (1995). Judge Kozinski also has recounted the unease he experi-
ences as a judge in capital cases. See Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, 11M NEW
YORxER, Feb. 10, 1997, at 48.
2 Id. at 6.
9Id. at 10.
240 Part of their cost is financial, and Kozinski and Gallagher rely on estimates that
as much as $3.2 million is spent on each case. See Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note
237, at 11-15. There are also the less apparent lost opportunity costs that other liti-
gants must bear due to the obligation of the state courts to hear the capital cases.
From this they observe:
So we are left in limbo, with machinery that is immensely expensive, that chokes
our legal institutions so they are impeded from doing all the other things a society ex-
pects from its courts, that visits repeated trauma on victims' families, and that ultimately
does not produce anything like the benefits we would expect from an effective death
penalty.
Id at 27-28.
241 IM at 29-32.
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tal punishment might then become a greater general deterrent
and rest more firmly on retribution.
Although the issue of inordinate delay seems to have
prompted their thoughts on the issue, 42 Kozinski and Gallagher
are not the first to suggest that the death penalty, as presently
administered, fails to achieve its asserted goals. Carol Steiker
and Jordan Steiker have argued that the death penalty is both
over- and under-regulated, and that, twenty years after subject-
ing the death penalty process to constitutional strictures, we
now have replicated the pre-Furman era of capital sentencing.43
Former Justices Blackmun2" and Powellf have also suggested
abolishing capital punishment due to its improper administra-
tion. In light of the seemingly futile effort of both the courts
and legislators to contain capital punishment within the rule of
law, what is in order is a serious reconsideration of whether it is
possible to have a fair and effective system of capital punish-
ment. I presently believe that it is. Part of the solution lies in
taking the death penalty seriously. Solutions to the issue of in-
ordinate delay lie in reforming the present capital punishment
process. Most of the delays occasioned between the pro-
nouncement of a guilty verdict and the actual execution of a
capital defendant occur while the case is in the state court sys-
tem. Consequently, reducing the time that the case spends in
state court, without also diminishing the quality of review,
should result in a more just and efficient system of capital pun-
ishment.
The courts should return to the standards announced in the
1976 cases, when the Court ruled that the death penalty did not
always violate the Eighth Amendment. Lockett v. Ohio,246 a lead-
"4 Kozinski wrote the majority decision in McKenzie, and Gallagher was his law
clerk at that time. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, For an Honest Death Penalty,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A21.
1 See Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 358-59
(1995).
214Justice Blackmun expressed himself in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
"Justice Powell's thoughts are captured in his biography. SeeJoHN C.JEFFRES, JR.,
JuSTiCE Lm F. PowELL,JR. 405-54 (1994).
246 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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ing case on mitigating circumstances decided two years later,
should be considered an amplification of the individualized sen-
tencing principle recognized in the 1976 cases.247 In Gregg, the
Court ruled that the death penalty was an appropriate sanction
if it achieved either deterrence or retribution.2 48 Notwithstand-
ing the inconclusive evidence that the death penalty served as a
deterrent to crime by others, the Court opined that deterrence
was most likely to have an influence in "carefully contemplated
murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of
death might enter the cold calculus that precedes the decision
to act. And there are some categories of murder, such as mur-
der by a life prisoner, where other sanctions may not be ade-
quate.", 49  Thus, in actuality the Court approved the death
penalty as a sentencing option-both legislatively and as a mat-
ter of prosecutorial policy-for a small category of crimes. The
Court reserved the death penalty for contract killers and for de-
fendants who would probably not be deterred from killing by
any other punishment. Reserving the death penalty to this class
of defendants might decrease the number of capital prosecu-
tions and convictions. This is because, though the contract kil-
ler is the arguably most culpable murderer, rarely does he
receive a death sentence. Few hired killers are apprehended,20
and when caught, they can usually gain leniency in exchange
for testifying against those who hired them and are felt to be
even more morally blameworthy. Presently, however, death row
contains many persons who "tend to be more impulsive, less
foresighted, and far more willing to use personal violence to ob-
tain their ends, even at considerable risk to themselves" than
247 Lockett held that in all but the rarest capital case a sentencer could not be pre-
cluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the crime that is proffered as a basis for a
sentence less than death. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion). Though the
Court was divided on this point, I believe Jurek anticipated the issue. See Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 303-05 (1976).
248Jurek, 428 U.S. at 183-85.
2149 Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
"0 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 354 n.124 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring);




most of society."' Executing these more impulsive murderers is
not likely to deter other impulsive killers; conceivably, their
execution may achieve some measure of retribution.
If inordinate delay is a cognizable issue in capital cases, it
could require the state, after obtaining a conviction and death
sentence, to choose which death row inmates were truly deserv-
ing of death. Suppose that in a given year fifty defendants re-
ceive death sentences in a state. After years of litigation, twenty-
four of those inmates remain under a death sentence, with fif-
teen of those capital defendants having exhausted their direct
appeals and litigated some of their claims in state and federal
post-conviction proceedings. Assume further that at any mo-
ment the state could set an execution date for each of these in-
mates, and that, in all likelihood, the execution would occur as
scheduled. If inordinate delay is a cognizable claim, the state,
under the threat of being precluded from executing a particular
inmate, would explicitly have to consider not only which of
those fifteen inmates to execute, but also the scheduling order
of the inmates. Such determinations would likely consider the
details and circumstances of the murder, the character of the
defendant, including his conduct after being sentenced to
death, and the penological objectives served by carrying out the
execution. In short, ruling that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its inordinate delay could have the salutary effect of requiring a
central state authority to decide which murderers were truly the
most deserving of death. Having a state authority make this de-
cision years after the crime and prosecution should allow for the
dissipation of some of the outrage caused by the murder. It
should also allow an assessment of the killing in light of other
killings committed about the same time. The state should be
put to this choice because the present administration of the
death penalty does not meaningfully reserve the death sentence
for either the most heinous crimes or the most incorrigible
criminals. 2 Presently, who gets sentenced to death depends
"'John Kaplan, TheProblern of CapitalPuniyhment, 1983 U. ILL.L. REv. 555, 556.
2 Technically, in some jurisdictions, the court are supposedly engaging in a simi-
lar inquiry when conducting comparative proportionality review. They are not typi-
cally doing so. See David Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
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more on where the crime is committed,2s the discretion of the
prosecutor,2 and the competence of defense counsel.2S
It is unclear what impact the judicial recognition of inordi-
nate delay claims would have on the number of executions. On
the one hand, if after a certain period a state is forced to select
more carefully the cases in which it will continue to seek the
death penalty, thent it is possible that, due to limited state re-
sources, there would be fewer executions. On the other hand,
to prevent inordinate delay a state could develop a capital pun-
ishment system that is financially expensive and requires a con-
siderable investment of time and other resources, and results in
a certain number of annual executions (some of which are of
questionable penological and social validity) .6 It seems doubt-
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRQINOLOGY 661 (1983);
Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts after
Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice"?, 87 J. GRIM. L. & CRMNOLOG 130 (1996).
Several scholars have considered how the death penalty is imposed in variousjurisdic-
ions. See, e.g., Samuel Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L REv. 27 (1984);
Raymond Pasternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty in
South Carolina: Experiences over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REv. 245 (1988); Raymond
Pasternoster & Ann Marie Kazyak, An Examination of Comparatively Excessive Death Sen-
tences in South Carolina, 1979-1987, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 475 (1989-90).
n' Studies have shown that the death penalty is unevenly applied within states. Wil-
liam J. Bowers & Glenn L Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman
Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DEiNQ. 563, 601-07 (1980) (felony murderers more likely
to be sentenced to death in northern Georgia than southern Georgia); Samuel R.
Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sen-
tencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 64 (1984) (rural homicides in
Georgia and Florida nearly twice as likely to result in death sentence than urban
homicides in those states).
" See generally BARRY NA.ELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRRINES OF THE
DEATH PENALTY (1987); Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in
NewJersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RuTGERS L. REv. 27 (1988); Raymond
Pasternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in
South Carolina, 74J. CRim. L. & CRMNOLOGY 754 (1983). See alsoJesse Katz, Executions
in Texas: No BigDeal, LA TMES, May 20, 1997, at Al (Harris County, Texas sentences
more people to death than most states); Tamar Lewin, Who Decides Who Will Die? Even
Wthin States, It Varies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, at B1.
See generally Bright, supra note 205.
See Rupert Cornwell, Death Row, Where Life Goes On and On, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr.
3, 1995, at A19 (making similar characterization of present capital punishment, but as
producing few executions); Craig Pittman, Killing Time on Death Row, ST. PETERSBURG
TimEs,July 6, 1996, at 1A (same).
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ful that supporters of capital punishment would consciously
construct such a system.
In the past two decades, both the legislative and executive
branches-with the later approval of the courts-have moved
away from the premises of the 1976 cases. Critical changes have
included modifying the capital sentencing process. For in-
stance, Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek held that the sentencer had to
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating cir-
cumstances, and could impose a death sentence only if the ag-
gravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. More recent cases have approved of sentencing
procedures that only require the sentencer merely "to consider"
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. These latter
sentencing procedures provide the sentencer with less guidance
in deciding when to impose the death sentence and conceivably
allow for a more arbitrary imposition of death sentences. Also,
Professor Robert Weisberg has suggested that one might cynically view the federal
judiciary as having constructed a complex body of capital punishment laws to avoid
having a large number of executions. According to him, this state of affairs tends to
satisfy proponents of capital punishment by not completely prohibiting the sanction.
Having relatively few executions also tends not to arouse too great an opposition to
the death penalty, except when an execution occurs. He notes that after the pro-
nouncement of a death sentence, most of the public does not pay further attention to
the case or the defendant. See Robert Weisberg, The New York Statute as Cultural Docu-
ment: Seeking the Morally Optimal Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 283, 286-87 (1996)
(applying the analogy to California and New York).
In 1980,Justice Rehnquist expressed a similar thought when he wrote:
Perhaps out of a desire to avoid even the possibility of a 'Bloody Assizes,' this Court and
the lower federal courts have converted the constitutional limits upon imposition of the
death penalty by the States and the Federal Government into arcane niceties which par-
allel the equity court practices described in Charles Dickens' 'Bleak House.'
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). This judicial scrutiny, the argument goes, has the effect of not only
slowing down the pace of executions, but also providing that, "[g] iven so many bites
at the apple, the odds favor (a death row inmate] finding some court willing to vacate
his death sentence because in its view his trial or sentence was not free from constitu-
tional error." Id. at 957 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). Justice Powell later suggested that
delay was attributable to the multiple levels ofjudicial review that a death case under-
goes. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1035,
1045-46 (1989).
' See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (defining rule of aggravating
circumstances as narrowing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and
thereby channeling the jury's discretion).
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upon proof of at least one aggravating circumstance, a state can
require that the defendant convince the sentencer not to im-
pose a death sentence, instead of having the prosecution prove
to the sentencer that the defendant deserves death25s Another
intractable component of the capital litigation process is the
prevalence of discretion. Every exercise of discretion threatens
consistent application of the death penalty. These changes
taken together have likely increased the number of defendants
on death row, without also guaranteeing that each capital de-
fendant was, relatively speaking, deserving of death.
A. AREAS OF REFORM
1. State Court Systems
Inordinate delay between the imposition of a death sen-
tence and an execution suggests that the capital litigation sys-
tem should be reconstituted. There are various avenues for
reform. Some state court systems, such as California and Flor-
ida, require that appellate review of a capital trial occur only
once-in the state court of last resort. Though providing only
one level of appellate review of capital cases might reduce the
time that a capital case is in the state court appellate process on
direct review, it is nonetheless problematic for several reasons.
First, it requires that the state high court spend its resources on
those cases, without the benefit that prior judicial review of the
case normally affords appellate cases.29 Additionally, appellate
court review by only one court in the direct review phase means
that collateral review proceedings become more important.
That is, if a defendant cannot develop certain arguments on di-
rect appeal, the state collateral review courts should allow the
defendant to develop those facts and arguments so that it can
28 See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (holding that statutory lan-
guage that sentencer "shall impose" death sentence if there are no mitigating circum-
stances does not prevent the sentencer from making individualized assessment of
appropriateness of death sentence); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305
(1990) (same).
" See Bentley Orrick, Justices Awash in Death Row Appeals, TAMPA TRBUNE, June 12,
1989, at 1A (Florida Supreme Court "spends between one-third and one-half of its
working time on death cases"); Cornwell, supra note 256, at A19.
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fairly adjudicate the case. Therefore, states that have many capi-
tal prosecutions need to consider whether not having multiple
levels of direct review has diminished the quality of review of
capital cases in direct and collateral proceedings. In jurisdic-
tions that have a separate civil and criminal appellate court sys-
tem, as in Texas, a better approach may be to authorize the
right to appeal to an intermediate appellate court, with discre-
tionary appeal to the state's highest court. One can defend hav-
ing all capital appeals lie to the highest appellate court as an
effort to ensure consistency in the judicial review of capital cases
by having the same judges review all death cases. This consis-
tency could perhaps be as effectively achieved by publishing the
decisions of the intermediate appellate court. Moreover, after
Pulley v. Harris,2f the federal constitution does not require that
courts ensure that defendants sentenced to death committed
comparatively horrible crimes. A state could address some con-
cerns about comparative proportionality review by adopting a
court rule that requires that the intermediate appellate court
engage in comparative proportionality analysis as part of its re-
view of capital convictions and sentences.
2. Defense Services
Another area ripe for reform is in the training, appoint-
ment and compensation of defense attorneys and the provision
of defense services. Reforming this area would likely eliminate
some of the delay in the death penalty process. 1 Convicted
capital defendants often question, years later, the adequacy of
investigations and the sufficiency of defense services. If defense
attorneys and defense services receive adequate compensation,
the services that they provide are more likely to be sufficient to
turn the capital trial and appeal process into the truly momen-
tous event that others have frequently envisioned for them.
Moreover, adequate trial and appellate attorneys should reduce
2 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not require
that state appellate court compare sentence in case before it with penalties imposed
in similar cases despite defendant's request that it do so).
2" See Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital Defense
Problems: It's A Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 AlA. L. REV. 1, 40-59 (1992).
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the most frequently litigated issue in post-conviction proceed-
ings: ineffective assistance of counsel. 62 Conscientious trial and
appellate attorneys would lay the groundwork for state and fed-
eral collateral review.
State courts should ensure that only qualified and compe-
tent attorneys handle post-conviction cases. This is because it is
now a certainty that if a capital inmate has not secured relief in
the state system, he will soon go to the federal courts, .where,
historically, the inmate has had a significantly greater chance of
obtaining relief.26 Further, considering the relative success that
capital defendants have had in securing relief in the federal
courts, federal habeas corpus should now be considered part of
the ordinary course of the capital litigation process. However,
the recent amendments to the federal habeas corpus law, de-
signed to reduce the opportunities for delay in the federal ha-
beas courts, may have the opposite effect as the courts must
assess the meaning of the new law.
3. Protection Against ExecutingFactually or Legally Innocent Defendants
Courts have reasoned that if they ruled that inordinate de-
lay claims are a substantive violation of the Eighth Amendment,
such a ruling would have the perverse effect of speeding up the
process of judicial review and increasing the probability of exe-
cuting an innocent person on death row.2 4 A partially incorrect
factual premise provides the basis for this contention. The
premise is that the reason for the delay in the processing of
capital cases is the dilatory tactics of capital defense attorneys,
and the belief that these attorneys are implicitly encouraged to
engage in such tactics when courts-during both direct and col-
lateral review-seriously consider their spurious arguments.
Thus, in taking time to rule on mostly meritless issues, the ar-
gument goes, courts unnecessarily delay the execution of prop-
22 See Victor E. Flago, Habeas Corpus Petitions in Death Penalty Litigation, 35 JUDGES'
J., Winter 1996, at 8, 10; Hanson & Daley, supra note 226, at 7.
263 SeeLiebman, supra note 63, at 541 n.15.
2" See, e.g., White v.Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1996); McKenzie v. Day, 57
F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995).
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erly convicted defendants. There is no evidence, however, that
a significant number of the legal claims asserted lack merit.
Some have cautioned that reducing the period between the
imposition of a death sentence and the execution might in-
crease the likelihood of executing an innocent person. Accord-
ing to Professors Bedau and Radelet, there have been at least
350 convictions of innocent persons for capital crimes or poten-
tially capital crimes in the United States during the twentieth
century.2 5 They place the cases into four categories: (1) errors
by the police before trial, (2) errors by the prosecution before
or during trial, (3) false testimony against the defendant, and
(4) "sundry other causes that enter in the proceedings." Injus-
tices perpetrated by the police, such as coerced confessions and
inadequate investigation of the crime, accounted for one-fourth
of the errors. Prosecutors who suppressed or fabricated evi-
dence were responsible for about one-seventh of the improper
convictions. In more than half of the 350 cases a witness' false
testimony helped secure the erroneous conviction. Someone
other than the defendant uncovered these alleged errors.
Sometimes the actual perpetrator confessed, an eyewitness re-
canted or revised his or her testimony, the trial judge pursued
an investigation on his own accord, or the police or prosecutor
later uncovered exculpatory evidence. It was "the dogged ef-
forts of defense counsel"2 that was by far the largest source of
uncovering the error that resulted in the improper conviction.
However, Bedau and Radelet note that "[t]here is no common
or typical route by which an innocent defendant can be vindi-
cated, and vindication, if it ever comes, will not necessarily come
in time to benefit the defendant."267 In more than half of the
surveyed cases, the erroneous conviction was corrected within
five years, but it took more than fifteen. years to uncover the er-
ror in thirty-nine cases.
' Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L Radelet, Miscanriages ofJustice in Potentially Capi-
tal Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 27 (1987). But see StephenJ. Markman & Paul G. Cas-
sell, Comments, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 121 (1988) (critiquing Bedau and Radelet's methodology and conclusions).
"Bedau & Radelet, supra note 265, at 67.
" Id. at 70.
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Bedau and Radelet's research suggests that an effectively
administered capital litigation process might diminish the risk
of executing innocent defendants. One possible reform is scru-
tinizing prosecutorial tactics. This is necessary because the
principles announced in Brady v. Maryland,s United States v.
Agurs,269 and United States v. Bagle °70 are apparently not suffi-
ciently inculcated to provide a safeguard so as to ensure that the
defense receives all of the exculpatory evidence. 7 If a state de-
cides not to authorize oversight of the prosecutorial and investi-
gative stages of a capital case (such as judicial review of charging
procedures), then it is more important that the defense have
adequate resources to conduct its own investigation in order to
put forth a sufficient trial defense.
4. Reconsidering the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, Defense Attorneys, and the
Public
Another area of reform is prosecutorial discretion. Despite
the virtually unchecked discretion that prosecutors presently en-
373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that due process is violated when prosecution
suppresses favorable material evidence requested by defendant); see also Richard A.
Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65
N.C. L. REv. 693 (1987) (noting that disciplinary actions against prosecutors are in-
frequently brought and proposing remedial measures).
269 427 U.S. 97, 114 (1976) (holding that the prosecutorial duty under Brady is vio-
lated when defendant is denied fair trial by nondisclosure).
270 473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985) (holding that the conviction should be reversed for a
Brady violation if the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of trial).
2" See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (considering whether nondisclosure of
evidence in capital case violated Brady).
Rolando Cruz's experience underscores this point. Three former Chicago area
prosecutors and four sheriff's deputies were indicted for allegedly presenting false
testimony and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence in prosecuting Cruz for the
1983 rape and murder of a 10-year-old girl. Cruz received a death sentence, but was
freed in 1995 after a deputy testifying in Cruz's third trial contradicted his testimony
from an earlier trial. Cruz's two prior convictions had been reversed.
Cruz had consistently maintained that an incriminating statement he allegedly
gave was fabricated. In 1995, a convicted child killer had already told his lawyer that
he committed the crime for which Cruz was charged. The indicted former prosecu-
tors also allegedly presented perjured testimony in Cruz's trials and buried notes of
an interview that could have exonerated him. See Ted Gregory & Maurice Possley, In-
dictments Tear at Prosecutorial Teflon: DuPage Charges Outline Conspiracy Against Crzz,
CICAGO TRIB., Dec. 13, 1996, at ID; Mark Hansen, How a Vision Failed: Indictment
Calls Prosecution a Conspiracy Against Suspect, 83 A.BA..J., Feb. 1997, at 26.
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joy, prosecutors should be more conscientious in seeking the
death penalty. Prosecutors ought to consider whether the capi-
tal litigation system can effectively handle another case and
whether it ought to handle this case instead of seeking to em-
ploy the sanction at every available opportunity. Prosecutors
should consider seriously whether treating the case as a capital
prosecution achieves justice for the individuals most intimately
involved in the case-the defendant, the victim, and their fami-
lies-and whether the prosecution is in the best interests of the
local and state governments that the prosecutor serves."' Once
the defendant receives the death sentence, prosecutorial offices
should continue to monitor the case and make every effort to
maintain court filings. The prosecutor's office should make
proper-that is, with notice to the defense-inquiries regularly
to appellate judges on the status of pending cases. Further,
courts and other supervisory authorities should not tolerate
prosecutorial misconduct. Such misconduct might become suf-
ficiently unattractive if the authorities regularly disciplined-in-
cluding criminal prosecution-those who initiate and maintain
clearly defective capital prosecutions. It is a serious indictment
of the capital litigation system when an experienced capital de-
fense attorney can claim that in nearly every capital case there is
evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching.278
Judges also have to remain very serious about the capital
cases tried and argued before them. Jurists who have philo-
sophical objections to capital punishment should recuse them-
' See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996) (suggesting that prosecutors make efficient use of prison re-
sources when making charging decisions); see also E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capi-
tal Punishment: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 658-67 (1996)
(discussing ethical and practical considerations of prosecuting capital cases); John A.
Horowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a Committee to Decide
Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2571 (1995) (proposing commit-
tee independent of prosecutor's office to make charging decisions in potential capital
cases); Robert Morganthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at
All (noting the impracticality of death penalty prosecutions).
27 See Richard H. Burr, Representing the Client on Death Row: The Politics of Advocacy,
59 U.M.KC. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1990).
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selves from capital cases.24 Judicial manipulation of the law to
achieve a certain result does not further justice. Judges who do
not recuse themselves should be willing to hold the state to the
established rules of law, and should be wary of invoking the
harmless error doctrine in capital cases. Further, if the convic-
tion or sentence falls outside the parameters of the law, the case
should not proceed and, if that matter becomes apparent on
appeal, the conviction or sentence should be reversed, regard-
less of the public outcry that is likely to occur.25 Similarly, if the
conviction and sentence are within the bounds of the law, the
appellate court should affirm.
Defense attorneys have to be willing to abandon the notion
that delay for its own sake is a permissible objective.f 6 At some
point, the public has to have its execution. It could be that after
a series of executions the public will lose its taste for capital
punishment. This seems to have occurred in Louisiana. In
1987, there were eight executions in that state. For nearly two
years after that only two defendants received death sentences,
although the homicide rate (and presumably the brutality of
some killings) did not change.2" While it does appear mis-
guided to allow the extinction of several lives to prove that the
present system of capital punishment does not achieve its articu-
' See Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Gonscientious
Abstention, Professional Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAw & HUM. BHAV.
67, 69 (1990).
2' I do not mean to suggest that judges should not attempt to explain fully and
truthfully. to the public-in both their opinions and on other occasions-the ration-
ale for their decisions. Rather, a judge's ruling on the propriety of the death sen-
tence in a particular case should not be overly influenced by public opinion.
"6 See Mello, supra note 84, at 51 ("To win time is to win. For the near-dead, a life-
time can be lived in five extra, snatched minutes.. . "); Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation,
Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HA1V. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rv. 325, 334-37 (1996).
27 Jason DeParle, Abstract Death Penalty Meets Real Execution, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1991, at § 4, p. 2; David A. Kaplan, Anger and Ambivalence, NEWswEE, Aug. 7, 1995, at
24, 29. It is difficult to determine the cause of this hesitancy. It is possible that the
message of local abolitionists, such as Sister Helen Prejean, began to take hold. I am
grateful to Jerry Phillips for this observation. See also Mike Williams, /rhida Gets Chair
Ready for 4 Executions in 9 Days, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Mar. 22, 1998, at 19A (detailing
Florida's effort to resume executions after unsuccessful legal challenge to use of elec-
tric chair as method of execution).
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lated goals,m at bottom, states have to be willing to consider
whether the legal experiment to contain the death penalty
within the rule of law is possible.m
Future challenges to the continued legality of the death
penalty might not lie in skirmishes over the death sentence in
particular cases, with the all but obligatory last minute protests
over the imminent perpetration of an "injustice."2  The next
step for abolitionists may be a greater effort to educate the pub-
lic on how capital punishment is presently administered.28 1 That
system is likely not in accord with the common perception. Jack
Greenberg, former Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Inc., (LDF) has noted:
Death penalty proponents have assumed a system of capital pun-
ishment that simply does not exist: a system in which the penalty is in-
flicted on the most reprehensible criminals and meted out frequently
enough both to deter and to perform the moral and utilitarian functions
ascribed to retribution. Explicitly or implicitly, they assume a system in
which certainly the worst criminals, Charles Manson or a putative killer
of one's parent or child, for example, are executed in an even-handed
manner. But this idealized system is not the American system of capital
punishment ....
Indeed, the reality of American capital punishment is quite to the
contrary. Since at least 1967, the death penalty has been inflicted only
' One of the objections to utilitarianism as a theory of punishment, particularly
general deterrence, is that it permits the punishment of an individual as an instru-
ment for the good of society. In this regard the dignity of the individual is subordi-
nated to the interests of society at large. See IMMANUEL KANT, TIM METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS oFJusTiCE 100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965).
' Justice Harlan did not think so. In McGautha he suggested judicial abdication:
"To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their per-
petrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in lan-
guage which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority,
appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability." McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971). It took twenty years, coupled with other developments in
death penalty and habeas corpus decisions, before, in Calins, Justice Blackmun de-
clared that he had reached the same conclusion. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1145 (1994) ("[T]he death penalty experiment has failed.").
See, e.g., Stephens v. Kemp, 464 U.S. 1027 (1983); see also Austin Sarat, Narrative
Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HAsV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 353, 359-64 (1996).
" See Michael D. Hintze, Attacking the Death Penalty: Toward a Renewed Strategy
Twenty Years After Furman, 24 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REv. 395, 424-33




rarely, erratically, and often upon the least odious killers, while many of
the most heinous criminals have escaped execution. Moreover, it has
been employed almost exclusively in a few formerly slave holding states,
and there it has been used almost exclusively against killers of whites, not
blacks. It is this system, not some idealized one, that must be defended
in any national debate on the death penalty.
2 2
Justice Marshall, who served as the Director-Counsel of the
NAACP LDF immediately before Greenberg, posed a similar
challenge in Furman. Recognizing that public opinion polls
were subject to great fluctuation on the issue, Justice Marshall
suggested that such polls would be of greater use if they ex-
pressed the views of "people who were fully informed as to the
purposes of the penalty and its liabilities."83 In his view, once so
informed, public support for the death penalty would markedly
decrease.2 4 Despite the efforts of abolitionists to have the death
penalty declared unconstitutional, it continues, probably be-
cause most Americans who express support for capital punish-
ment do not know how it actually operates.
If courts conclude that the Eighth Amendment does pro-
hibit an inordinate delay between the pronouncement of a
death sentence and the carrying out of that sentence, that rul-
ing may result in further refinements in the administration of
the death penalty. States would have a greater incentive to en-
sure that the defendant receives adequate legal assistance at the
earliest moment, and when it matters most: at trial and on di-
rect appeal.se One way for a state to address both concerns is by
providing adequate training for capital defense attorneys. States
would also have a greater incentive to eliminate the unnecessary
282 Greenberg, supra note 250, at 1670.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (Marshall,J., concurring).
2" Marshall's thesis has been borne out by empirical evidence. Although they had
only 181 valid responses, two researchers concluded that Marshall's intuition was ba-
sically correct. Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the
Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIs. L. REv. 171; see also William
J. Bowers, et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on Capital Punishment: What Citizens and
Legislatures Prefer, 22 AM. J. GiM. L. 77, 82-92 (1994) (reviewing studies on public sup-
port for death penalty).
5 The inadequacy of legal counsel is most severe in indigent capital cases. See
Bright, supra note 205, at 1849-52; see also Marcia Coyne, et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and
Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30.
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delay that occurs on direct appeal and during collateral attacks
on the conviction and sentence. It would also provide the state
with an increased motive to monitor death cases, instead of let-
ting the cases languish in the system. Supporters of time limits
by which capital defendants have to litigate their post-conviction
challenges contend that time limitations will encourage inmates
to bring forward their claims at the earliest occasion. The inor-
dinate delay principle could place a similar incentive on the
states for them to provide adequate resources-including judges
and additional court personnel, if necessary-to adjudicate
claims raised in capital cases. Most importantly, the issue of in-
ordinate delay might invite proponents and opponents of the
death penalty to examine the present administration of capital
punishment. Until courts address the issue on its merits, how-
ever, the arguments over capital punishment will continue in a
discussion that is devoid of reality.
VII. CONCLUSION
Some contemporary claimants have spent about twice as
long as the average inmate on death row and have unsuccess-
fully claimed that their inordinate stays on death row violate
their Eighth Amendment rights. This Article has considered
the procedural issues that a federal court should address in a
capital habeas petition asserting inordinate delay. If the previ-
ous cases are indicative, then a defendant is more likely to be on
death row for an inordinate period when the case is on the
margins of death eligibility and errors occur during in the
state's processing of the case.
Despite a firm commitment to capital prosecutions, the
states have not managed to establish effective and efficient capi-
tal case processing systems for cases in the post-trial stage. Con-
sequently, most of the delay occurs after the imposition of a
death sentence. This delay suggests that other actors in the
capital litigation process have serious questions about the ap-
propriateness of the death sentence. After experiencing inor-
dinate delay, a capital defendant should be able to file a federal
habeas petition and rely on his or her post-sentencing conduct
as a basis for challenging the appropriateness the death sen-
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tence. The most commonly voiced objections against recogniz-
ing inordinate delay as a substantive limit on death eligibility do
not withstand hard scrutiny, when considered in light of the ac-
tual dynamics of the capital litigation process. In fact, recogniz-
ing inordinate delay as a basis for setting aside a death sentence
might serve to bring about needed reforms in the administra-
tion of capital punishment. The suggested reforms should help
reduce or eliminate inordinate delay between the imposition of
a death sentence and a proposed execution, without diminish-
ing the quality of review. Close attention to the process itself,
moreover, may cause the public to reconsider the soundness of
capital punishment.
